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I.   INTRODUCTION
For over two hundred years, the common law divided children into
two categories—marital and nonmarital.1 The mother’s husband was
automatically, and almost conclusively, the father of a marital child.
The biological father of a nonmarital child was determined, when
necessary, by bastardy or paternity proceedings. As recently demon-
strated by two Florida Supreme Court cases,2 a third category of
children has emerged—children who appear to be marital children
but whose biological fathers are not their mothers’ husbands. Now
that genetic testing can accurately, rapidly, and inexpensively de-
termine paternity, this third category, “quasi-marital children,” pres-
ents distinct and complex legal issues regarding fatherhood.
The disparate treatment of quasi-marital children in Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Privette3 and Daniel v. Dan-
iel4 illustrates the need for substantive and procedural clarification.
In both cases, mothers seeking support for their children were un-
successful due to inadequate legal rules. In Privette, the Florida Su-
preme Court provided a complex procedure for shifting the status of
“legal father” from the marital father to the biological father if, in the
court’s view, such action would be in the child’s best interests.5 The
opinion left many issues open for redress including jurisdictional
questions,6 issues regarding guardians ad litem,7 and questions as to
when the standards set forth in Privette should apply.8 Four years
later, in Daniel, the court complicated jurisdictional issues further
and ultimately fictionalized the right to legitimacy recognized in
Privette.9
New statutory rules for determining paternity and parental rights
and responsibilities for quasi-marital children must supplant the
common law. Both the courts and the Florida Legislature must ad-
                                                                                                                      
1. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 434-37
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1765). Under strict English common law, parents had to be
married prior to the child’s birth for the child to be legitimate. See id. at 434. In compari-
son, a bastard was a child born out of lawful matrimony, even if his parents married sub-
sequent to his birth. See id. at 442.
2. See Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1997) (holding that in a dissolution of
marriage, a husband has no legal duty to support a child who is not his natural or adopted
child); Department of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the law
presumes a child’s best interest is served by upholding legitimacy in a paternity action).
3. 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).
4. 695 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1997).
5. See Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308.
6. See id. (requiring a showing of good faith and the likelihood of a favorable outcome
as a prerequisite to bringing a suit).
7. See id. (suggesting the appointment of a guardian ad litem to ensure the child’s
best interests).
8. See id. at 309-10 (pointing to a lack of factual development in the record).
9. See infra Part IV.A.
1999]                         QUASI-MARITAL CHILDREN 221
dress the conflict between two opposing ideologies: one that gives
deference to biology and the other, deference to the family unit. As a
general rule, this conflict must be resolved in the best interests of the
child.
Part II of this Article provides a more precise, less judgmental vo-
cabulary with which to analyze and define the issues surrounding
quasi-marital children. Part III then provides a historical overview
explaining how and why these issues have recently emerged and how
the common law used the presumption of legitimacy as a procedural
tool to conceal an unresolved substantive conflict within natural law
theory. This procedural mechanism allowed the common law to favor
marital fathers and family interests while purporting to favor bio-
logical fathers. Next, Parts IV and V examine two recent Florida Su-
preme Court decisions that demonstrate how the common law is in-
adequate to protect quasi-marital children in a legal world where ge-
netic testing weakens the presumption of legitimacy’s substantive
function.
Finally, Part VI introduces a proposed statutory revision to chap-
ter 742, Florida Statutes. The proposal is based in part on the Cali-
fornia parentage statute10 but is refined to address the issues identi-
fied in Privette, Daniel, and other recent cases. The proposal aims to
provide quasi-marital children with family units and economic sup-
port whenever possible, while also providing reasonable remedies for
biological fathers, marital fathers, and biological mothers. The pro-
posal does not resolve the inherent conflict within natural law theory
because it does not exclusively implement either the family ideology
or the biological ideology. The proposal, however, exposes the conflict
and attempts to select family interests over biological interests. The
proposed statutory revision is designed to stimulate debate in the
hopes that a final version can be submitted to the Florida Legislature
for enactment in the near future.
II.   NEUTRAL TERMINOLOGY
Initially, a more precise, less judgmental vocabulary should be
used in analyzing the legal issues surrounding quasi-marital chil-
dren. Common law concepts of paternity, parentage, and legitimacy,
created to address two categories of children—marital and nonmari-
tal—prove inadequate when used in reference to the third category,
quasi-marital children.
                                                                                                                      
10. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1997). The United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the California parentage statute in 1989. See Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989).
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A.   The Legal Lexicon of Fatherhood
Existing legal terms are often too vague and ambiguous to suffi-
ciently describe the legal complexities of children born to married
women when the biological father is not the woman’s lawful husband
at the time of the child’s birth. The current vocabulary uses old
terms, such as “natural father”11 and “legitimacy,”12 which are either
legally undefined or have inconsistent definitions in current law.
New terms, such as “legal father,”13 have no established definition in
                                                                                                                      
11. The evolution of the modern concept of “natural father” could be the subject of a
lengthy article. It is undefined in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). The term is
used in the Uniform Parentage Act to designate the biological father based on five situa-
tions giving rise to the presumption of natural lineage. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B
U.L.A. 298-99 (1987).
The term “natural father” has not always been limited to situations where a genetic test
has been performed or where it is otherwise virtually certain that the putative father is the
biological father. It is often used to describe the marital father after the family unit has
been altered in some manner. See, e.g., Department of HRS v. Dougherty, 700 So. 2d 77, 78
(Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (using the term “natural father” to indicate that the biological father
was divorced from the mother); Fitts v. Poes, 699 So. 2d 348, 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (con-
cerning a biological father, referred to as the “natural father,” who, after the death of the
biological mother, married a woman who is now the adoptive stepmother).
Earlier courts tended to use the term only in reference to the presumed biological father
of a bastard child. See, e.g., In re Cotton, 6 F. Cas. 617, 618 (D. Conn. 1843) (holding that a
“child born in lawful wedlock has a right to claim of its father protection, support, and edu-
cation; and these are all duties, in their nature and essence, similar to the duty which the
natural father owes his illegitimate child”).
12. Legitimacy, as a legal concept, was initially more important for determining the
child’s rights of inheritance than the father’s parental rights. See 2 SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 260 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2d ed. 1898). Some states attempt to carefully distinguish between legitimacy in the
context of inheritance and in the context of paternity. See Denbow v. Harris, 583 A.2d 205,
207 n.1 (Me. 1990) (stating that paternity is a question of biology while legitimacy is rele-
vant to inheritance law). Nonmarital and quasi-marital children present difficulties in the
law of inheritance that are not always well addressed by the concept of legitimacy. See,
e.g., Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 93, 94.
13. The use of the term “legal father” could also warrant discussion in a separate arti-
cle. The term is used extensively in law review articles and in the case law of other states,
which usually employ a meaning comparable with the use in this Article—the individual
legally recognized as having all rights, responsibilities, and obligations of fatherhood with
respect to the specific child or children. Prior to Privette, the word had no definition in
Florida case law, and it still has no definition in Florida Statutes. See Privette, 617 So. 2d
at 307 (defining “legal father” as the father named on the birth certificate).
The Florida Supreme Court used the term “legal father” on only two occasions prior to
Privette. See In re Brown, 85 So. 2d 617, 619 (Fla. 1956) (regarding an adoption proceeding
in which “legal father” was used in quotation marks to describe a putative or biological fa-
ther—not a marital father); Theis v. City of Miami, 564 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. 1990) (using
the term “legal father” to describe the marital father of a quasi-marital child who sought
workers’ compensation death benefits).
In the Florida District Courts of Appeal, the term “legal father” was first used to describe
the marital father of a quasi-marital child born after 40 weeks of marriage but before per-
manent separation. See In re J.P., 220 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Ironically, the
Third District Court of Appeal held that the term be stricken from the trial court’s order on
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either case law or statutes. “Father” is ambiguous because the term
may include several different men or functions. A child whose bio-
logical mother had an affair, divorced, remarried, and then sepa-
rated, for example, could have a biological father, a marital father,
and an adoptive stepfather, and still fail to have a man to provide
emotional support as a functional father or economic support as a
support father. Because marital children, especially infants, have
only a presumptive legal father under the common law, there is an
inherent ambiguity in the term “father.”14
Following the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Privette, “pa-
ternity” and “parentage” have been used to describe either a deter-
mination of biological fatherhood or a determination of parental
rights unrelated to biology.15 Finally, our lexicon is cluttered with
                                                                                                                      
the assumption that the term implied that the marital father was the biological father. See
id. In Randolph v. McCullough, 342 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the West Publishing
Company used the term in its synopsis to describe a marital father of a quasi-marital child
that was born after 40 weeks of marriage but before permanent separation. See id. at 129.
In In re Baby Boy S., 349 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), the court described the marital fa-
ther, who had consented to an adoption of a quasi-marital child born after 40 weeks of
marriage but before permanent separation, as a “legal father.” See id. at 775. In Perez v.
Stevens, 362 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), the term describes the father of a nonmarital
child as established by a paternity order. See id. at 999. This use is compatible with
Privette in the sense that this father’s name will be placed upon the birth certificate. See
Privette, 617 So. 2d at 307.
In In re Estate of Broxton, 425 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), a marital father of a possi-
ble quasi-marital child was described as “the natural as well as the legal father.” Id. at 24.
In Hess v. Hess, 466 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), a post-dissolution marital father of
quasi-marital children born 40 weeks after marriage, but before permanent separation, de-
scribed himself as the “spiritual and legal father,” although it was unclear whether he was
the legal father. Id. at 1180. Erwin v. Everard, 561 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), is
similar to Privette because the mother sued the biological father for support of a quasi-
marital child without joining the marital father. The terse opinion strangely describes the
biological father as the “natural biological father.” Id. at 445. The court later describes the
marital father as a “legal father,” meaning that he would be required to pay support under
the trial court’s erroneous ruling. See id. at 446.
In Kalbach v. Department of HRS, 563 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and Walden v.
Munson, 593 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the term “legal father” describes the father of
a nonmarital child whose fatherhood had been established by a final judgment of pater-
nity. See Kalbach, 563 So. 2d at 809-10; Walden, 593 So. 2d at 1215. Finally, in E.V. v. De-
partment of HRS, 615 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), E.V. is described as the “legal father”
of A.L.M., whose mother is C.M. See id. It is unclear whether the court relied upon mar-
riage or some other basis to describe E.V. as the legal father.
In Long v. Long, 716 So. 2d 329, 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the Second District Court of
Appeal removed the word “legal” from the final judgment, which described the marital fa-
ther as the legal father.  The court apparently thought that “legal” suggested that the trial
court had determined that the marital father was the biological father.
14. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 16 So. 2d 163, 163-64 (Fla. 1944) (recognizing the com-
mon law’s strong presumption of legitimacy).
15. Although chapter 742, Florida Statutes, is entitled “Determination of Parentage,”
the chapter determines “paternity” as a biological fact. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742 (1997 &
Supp. 1998).
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terms like “bastard,”16 “illegitimate,”17 and even “out-of-wedlock,”18
which have strong religious and moral overtones that tend, at least
subconsciously, to interfere with objective, rational analysis.
Because the present dialogue lacks objective terminology, this Ar-
ticle employs the following terms: marital child, nonmarital child,
and quasi-marital child. “Marital child” refers to a child conceived by
or born to a married woman when the biological father was the
woman’s husband at the time of conception or birth.19 A “nonmarital
child” refers to a child born to an unmarried woman. This is the anti-
quated bastard or spurious child, which Florida Statutes now typi-
cally describe as a child “out-of-wedlock.”20 This more neutral term is
used in other states.21 “Quasi-marital child” describes a child born to
a married woman when the biological father is not the woman’s law-
ful husband. This term is an appropriate, neutral term because only
the husband, or the marital father, is identified on the child’s Florida
birth certificate,22 and the child often appears to be a “marital
child.”23
                                                                                                                      
16. Florida’s Bastardy Act was renamed the Paternity Act in 1975. See Act effective
Oct. 1, 1975, ch. 75-166, § 10, 1975 Fla. Laws 298, 302. All references to bastardy proceed-
ings and the term “bastard” were removed from the entire Act. See id.
17. The word “illegitimate” was also removed from the Bastardy Act in 1975. See id.
However, “illegitimate” was featured prominently in Privette and was used as a factor in
the supreme court’s analysis concerning the steps necessary to support an order requiring
genetic testing. See Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308.
18. “Out-of-wedlock” replaced the term “illegitimate” in the Parentage Act in 1975.
See Act effective Oct. 1, 1975, ch. 75-166, 1975 Fla. Laws 298. The term is sometimes used
to describe both nonmarital and quasi-marital children. See, e.g., 14 C.J.S. Children Out-
of-Wedlock § 1 (1991). This loose clumping resulted from the fact that both nonmarital and
quasi-marital children were historically deemed “illegitimate” under the common law of
some states. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 439 So. 2d 174, 175 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (noting
that an illegitimate child can be born in or out of wedlock); see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH 200-07 (1985) (highlighting the post-Revolutionary trend toward
expanding the legal notion of legitimacy).
19. The common law legitimized, or at least presumptively legitimized, any child born
in lawful wedlock or within a competent time afterwards. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1,
at 434; see also Dennis v. Department of HRS, 566 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
By statute, Florida now allows a nonmarital child to become a marital child by virtue of a
marriage between the biological parents following the birth of the child. See FLA. STAT. §
742.091 (1997). This Article’s statutory proposal does not affect this rule, which presuma-
bly would remain in Part II of the proposed act.
20. See FLA. STAT. § 742.10 (1997) (establishing paternity for children born out of
wedlock).
21. See In re Estate of Sekanic, 653 N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (using the
term “out-of-wedlock” exclusively in an action to determine paternity for inheritance pur-
poses); see also Brashier, supra note 12 at 93.
22. See FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2) (1997).
23. Although the term “quasi-marital child” is used extensively in this Article, it is
not used in the proposed statute, which addresses three distinct types of quasi-marital
children.
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A father is described as a biological father, a marital father, a le-
gal father, a functional father, or a support father. Any one father
may occupy one or several of these definitions simultaneously. A
biological father is the man whose sperm fertilized the mother’s egg,
usually through an act of sexual intercourse.24 The term is used on
three occasions in Florida Statutes and frequently in case law.25 Al-
though the term “genetic father” is sometimes used as an equivalent
for biological father,26 this Article will reserve genetic father for the
limited purpose of describing a sperm donor’s role in an artificial in-
semination.27
The “marital father” is the mother’s husband on the day the child
is born. Except in very rare cases involving a judicial determination
of paternity prior to the child’s birth, this is the father whose name
appears on the birth certificate for each child born to a married
woman in Florida.28 In the proposed statute, the term “husband” is
used to describe the marital father.29 However, in cases involving
                                                                                                                      
24. See generally Tracy Cashman, When Is a Biological Father Really a Dad?, 24
PEPP. L. REV. 959 (1997) (explaining the benefits to the child if biological fathers are pre-
vented from asserting rights long after birth).
25. See FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(i)(2)(d) (1997) (concerning contracts to transfer paren-
tal rights); id. § 742.12(4) (1997) (concerning scientific testing for paternity); id. §
751.011(2) (defining “putative father”). Based on a Westlaw search on November 11, 1998,
“biological father” has been used over 100 times in Florida case law and was first used in
1973. See Taylor v. Taylor, 279 So. 2d 364, 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (relieving the marital
father of child support obligations, over Judge Walden’s strong dissent, because the mari-
tal father was not the child’s biological father).
26. See Brashier, supra note 12, at 134-37.
27. The scope of this Article does not include the complex issues of surrogacy. There is
a considerable body of literature discussing artificial insemination, surrogate mothers, gay
parenting, and other contemporary issues. See generally Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doc-
trinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343
(1995); David L. Chambers, What If: The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996); Malina Coleman,
Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Repro-
duction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497 (1996); Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia,
Contradiction and The New Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473 (1996); Alexa
E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative Repro-
duction, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 329 (1995); Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology
and the Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951 (1996); Benjamin L. Weiss,
Single Mothers’ Equal Right to Parent: A Fourteenth Amendment Defense Against Forced-
Labor Welfare “Reform,” 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 215 (1997). The legal issues surrounding these
matters are complex and fascinating.
In the artificial insemination scenario, the legal father is often the marital father, and in
the surrogate motherhood scenario, the legal father is often the biological father or the re-
ceiving mother’s husband. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.16 (1997). In this way, the legislative
policies for these rare children are compatible with the approach this Article suggests for
quasi-marital children.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2)(a) (1997); cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §4, 9B U.L.A. 298-
99 (1987).
29. See infra Appendix, § 742.301.
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mothers who have been married multiple times, “husband” is not al-
ways accurate.
In this Article and in the proposed statute, the term “legal father”
means the man who is legally identified as the person with all the
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations of fatherhood for a specific
child.30 The man who actually raises the child is referred to as the
“functional father.” More traditionally, this is “dad”: the man who
provides both economic and emotional support for the child,31 and
with whom the child develops a lasting emotional bond. Two or more
men (or arguably women) can perform these functions. In the setting
of a divorced family, it may now be common for a child to have two
functional fathers—a stepfather and a marital father.32
A “support father” describes a man who only is expected to pro-
vide economic support for a child, and either has no visitation or cus-
tody rights or is not expected to fulfill these nurturing functions for
personal reasons. Until recently, a bastardy or paternity action was
designed primarily to identify a support father for a nonmarital
child.33 The “putative father” is a man who is merely alleged to be the
                                                                                                                      
30. As discussed later, the term “legal father” does not have this meaning in Daniel
and has not been consistently defined in the case law. See Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d
1253, 1254 (Fla. 1997) (holding that a husband who is not the biological father and not an
adoptive parent does not have a legal obligation to support the child, despite the child’s le-
gitimate status). The term “legal father” had little legal significance in Florida until the
supreme court used the term in Privette. That decision rather casually defined the term
parenthetically as “the one listed on the birth certificate.” Department of HRS v. Privette,
617 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1993).
31. See Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 U. FLA. L. REV. 523, 527 (1996)
(discussing gender biases and the father’s nurturing role). This Article uses the term “func-
tional father” because it is more neutral, although this man may be someone who nurtures
the child. Because a functional father can be a surrogate of many varieties, the term in-
cludes psychological fathers and others who willingly perform the functions of fatherhood.
See generally CHRISTOPHER P. ANDERSEN, FATHER: THE FIGURE & THE FORCE (1983).
32. There is an ongoing debate concerning the need for fathers in the family and the
role that fathers should play within that structure. The author believes functional fathers
are needed, and the state should strongly promote the existence of such fathers for chil-
dren. Further discussion of this policy may be found elsewhere. See generally DAVID
BLANKENSHIP, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM
(1995); Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers . . . And a Sperm Donor with
Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1996); Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate
Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual
Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 392 (1996) (having a functional father helps to en-
sure that the reality of the family structure will not be destroyed in the child’s mind); Amy
L. Wax, The Two-Parent Family in the Liberal State: The Case for Selective Subsidies, 1
MICH. J. RACE & L. 491, 533 (1996) (stating that the presence of a functional father in the
family increases the chances of raising a law-abiding citizen, thereby imposing fewer costs
on society).
33. Even today, chapter 742, Florida Statutes, contains no express provisions for visi-
tation or other parental rights for fathers determined in paternity actions. To avoid consti-
tutional issues, the Determination of Parentage Act was construed in 1974 as giving the
biological father parentage rights comparable to the rights of a father in a divorce pro-
ceeding. See Brown v. Bray, 300 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 1974). Until 1951, the biological fa-
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father, usually the biological father. The allegation is normally made
in a lawsuit in which the putative father may or may not be a party.34
“Putative father” is defined in Florida Statutes, but only in the con-
text of a putative father seeking to obtain temporary custody of a
child.35
The term “paternity” should only refer to biological fatherhood.
Once paternity is determined, the law decides what rights and re-
sponsibilities, if any, to give the biological father. Allocating these
rights and responsibilities is not a paternity decision, but a parent-
age decision. Accordingly, “parentage” should only be used to refer to
legal fatherhood. Parentage determination places the rights and re-
sponsibilities of a legal guardian for a specific child in one man (or
perhaps two or more persons). Parentage may or may not be based on
paternity. The presumption of legitimacy, for example, is actually a
rule of parentage not based on paternity.
While this Article attempts to use the terms parentage and pater-
nity as consistently and carefully as possible, the use of these terms
in existing law may make this effort difficult.36 Not all of these terms
and definitions are used, or used consistently, in Florida Statutes
and case law.
B.   Three Types of Quasi-Marital Children
Quasi-marital children, children who appear to be marital chil-
dren but whose fathers are not their mothers’ husbands, have existed
in society since very early times.37 Accurate information on the num-
bers of these children is virtually impossible to obtain. However, one
report suggests that as many as ten percent of all children born to
                                                                                                                      
ther was “condemned by the judgment” to pay the incidental expenses of the birth and up
to $50 annually to the mother. FLA. STAT. § 742.03 (1941) (repealed by Act effective June 9,
1951, ch. 26949, § 9, 1951 Fla. Laws 1185, 1187). After 1951, the statute contained modest
child support provisions, which often discriminated against nonmarital children. See FLA.
STAT. § 742.041 (1961) (repealed by Act effective October 1, 1986, ch. 86-220, § 157, 1986
Fla. Laws 1603, 1726). Occasionally, this Article and the proposed statute refer to a “puta-
tive biological father” to avoid any possible confusion.
34. For example, the putative father was not a true party in Daniel; he was merely
deposed in the action as a witness. See Daniel, 695 So. 2d at 1254 n.1.
35. See FLA. STAT. § 751.011(2) (1997) (stating that a putative father is “a man who
reasonably believes himself to be the biological father of the minor child, but who is unable
to prove his paternity due to the absence of the mother of the child”).
36. One of the reasons that the Florida Supreme Court had difficulties determining
parentage in Privette is that the Legislature had entitled chapter 742, “Determination of
Parentage,” but the provisions therein, for all issues other than surrogate parentage, are
designed to determine paternity, not parentage.
37. The possible magnitude of this problem is reflected in the fact that 2000 years
ago, the Ten Commandments contained not one, but two provisions related to the subject:
“thou shalt not commit adultery,” and “thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife.” Exodus
20:14, 17.
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married women in the 1940s were quasi-marital children.38 Quasi-
marital children comprise a group that can be divided into at least
three separate categories based on the timing of the child’s birth in
relation to the status of the marriage. This Article defines these
categories simply as Type I, Type II, and Type III quasi-marital chil-
dren.39 Each category presents distinct issues requiring potentially
different solutions. Existing law, however, does not recognize this
categorical distinction. There are many different sets of circum-
stances resulting in quasi-marital children within each category, but
the children present legal issues allowing similar analysis and solu-
tions.
1.   Type I
Type I quasi-marital children are conceived prior to marriage but
born during the marriage. The woman is impregnated by the biologi-
cal father, then marries the marital father during the pregnancy.
The child in these cases is the product of premarital sex, not an act of
adultery.
In Type I cases the parties can have varying degrees of knowledge
regarding the circumstances of the pregnancy. The biological father
may be aware of the child before the marriage, or he may never know
of the child. At the time of the marriage, the marrying couple may
have complete knowledge of the circumstances, or they may discover
these circumstances a few months later. The marital father may
have engaged in premarital sex with the mother and believes he is
the biological father. The mother may know the marital father is not
the biological father, may be uncertain, or may mistakenly believe
the marital father is the biological father. The mother may be un-
aware of the pregnancy at the time of the marriage. Finally, there
are instances when the marital father knows the biological father
abandoned the mother, but he chooses to marry her regardless.
The marital father of a Type I child is similar in some respects to
a stepfather. If the mother had married the biological father, di-
vorced him (even prior to the birth), and then re-married, the new
husband would be the marital father and the stepfather. Regardless
of the mother’s marriage to another man, the biological father has a
reasonable basis to request a relationship with a Type I quasi-
marital child. In addition, the marital father may reasonably believe
                                                                                                                      
38. JARED DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE 85-87 (1992). Given the extensive test-
ing of families for donor organ purposes, it is likely that more recent information is avail-
able, but the author has not located such data.
39. In the proposed statutory revision, Type I is described as children born within 40
weeks of marriage, Type III as children born after permanent separation, and Type II as
all children born between these two periods. See infra Appendix.
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that he should not be forced to support the child, even if he does not
want to divorce his wife. However, both men could conceivably want
nothing to do with the child.40
2.   Type II
Type II quasi-marital children are conceived when the mother is
lawfully married and living with her husband. The biological father,
however, is not the marital father. These children are conceived
through an act of adultery.41 Normally, these children are born dur-
ing the marriage, although sometimes birth occurs after a marital
separation.
As with Type I quasi-marital children, there can be varying levels
of knowledge in Type II cases. The biological father may not know of
the child’s existence. He may not realize that he is the father of his
lover’s child. The mother may not know for certain which man is the
biological father. The marital father may be aware of the adultery, or
he may be ignorant of the relationship and believe that he is the bio-
logical father. The biological father may not know that his lover is
married.
Unlike Type I children, these children are more likely to have
older siblings. The fact that the child is a Type II child often may be
concealed from the child, his or her siblings, and from the commu-
nity. Type II children are the ones who, in many cases, are raised “as
if” they are marital children. The biological father will have a more
difficult time establishing a reasonable basis to claim an interest in a
Type II child. The marital father, however, may still wish to avoid
                                                                                                                      
40. This Article does not discuss the type of child that exists between nonmarital and
Type I. If a child is conceived and delivered before marriage, and the mother marries
shortly after the birth, it is likely that her new husband will be the functional father even
if he is not the biological father. Section 742.091, Florida Statutes, allows a “reputed” fa-
ther to become the legal father by such a marriage. See FLA. STAT. § 742.091 (1997). In
light of recent amendments, a declaration of paternity becomes an establishment of pater-
nity after 60 days, subject to challenge for fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. See
Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-170, § 70, 1997 Fla. Laws 3202, 3255 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 742.10(1) (1995)). In a statutory revision, any refinements addressing these chil-
dren should occur in a provision dealing with nonmarital children. See L.A. v. H.H., 710
So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
41. Adultery is arguably more of a religious, moral, or ethical factor than a legal fac-
tor. Historically, adultery of any variety was a capital offense in the colonies. See THE
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1641-1691, at 12 (Scholarly Resources, Inc.
1976) (1648). Today, open adultery, or adulterous cohabitation, is a crime in Florida, but
private extramarital sexual activity is legal. See FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (1997). Although the
open adultery law is rarely enforced, adultery, nevertheless, remains a factor that may be
considered in determining financial issues in dissolution of marriage proceedings. See id. §
61.08(1). Thus, while we no longer tend to criminalize adultery, legal and social policies
still discourage such conduct.
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paying support for the child if he is obviously not the child’s biologi-
cal father.
3.   Type III
A Type III quasi-marital child is conceived and born after a mar-
ried couple has permanently separated but prior to their divorce.
With a Type III quasi-marital child, it is often clear that the marital
father is not the biological father. It is also possible that the mother
cannot identify the biological father and that the biological father is
unaware of the child’s existence. On the other hand, the mother and
the biological father may have a stable marriage-like relationship.
Finally, the marital father may be so estranged that he is unaware of
the child’s existence.
If the separation has been lengthy, the marital father will likely
have little interest in serving as either a functional or a support fa-
ther. If Florida recognized some concept of de facto divorce,42 the
marital father would not be a father at all, but he is nevertheless the
legal father on the child’s birth certificate—“stuck” with a support
obligation for the child because he failed to divorce the child’s
mother.
From the child’s perspective, these three situations may present
somewhat different needs and interests. A Type I child may have a
meaningful, functional relationship with his or her biological father,
just like many children in divorced families have good relationships
with their divorced marital fathers.43 A Type II child may want to fit
quietly into his or her present, stable family. A Type III child may
simply have no connection to his or her marital father. All three
types of quasi-marital children, however, share a need for adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and adult affection. As a matter of public pol-
icy, all of these children need a functional father, or at least a sup-
port father.44
Controversies surrounding the category of quasi-marital children
can arise in several different fora. Several different parties can raise
paternity issues at various times in the child’s life. Either the hus-
band or the wife can raise the issue in a divorce. Determination of
paternity, pursuant to chapter 742, Florida Statutes, can be filed by
any man, woman, or child, and the chapter does not contain a specific
                                                                                                                      
42. Florida has not recognized common law marriages since January 1, 1968. See id. §
741.211. Common law marriages created too many ambiguities and confusions. Ironically,
as divorce has become more complex and expensive, there seems to be a growing group in
Florida who obtain legal marriages but do not obtain a divorce upon permanent separation.
43. The phrase “divorced marital father” is used because there is no guarantee that
the ex-husband is the biological father.
44. See discussion supra note 32.
1999]                         QUASI-MARITAL CHILDREN 231
statute of limitations.45 Moreover, it is somewhat unclear who has
standing to file the paternity action on behalf of the child. The action
can be maintained by the marital or putative biological grandpar-
ents, other relatives, a guardian ad litem, or, as Privette demon-
strates, even by the state if welfare benefits are at stake.46 Paternity
can also be raised in a probate action;47 in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights; in an adoption; or, in a temporary custody proceed-
ing filed by a putative father or other members of the extended fam-
ily, including grandparents.48 Because paternity can be raised in so
many contexts, it is difficult to know who has standing to raise the
issue and when it may be raised.
The proposed statute in the Appendix of this Article would limit
the parties, fora, and time for filing such an action. Legal parentage
would generally need to be resolved in the first two years of the
child’s life in a chapter 742 proceeding in which the biological
mother, marital father, and putative father were parties. The child
could be represented by a guardian ad litem, but no provisions are
included for suits filed by or on behalf of the child by such a guard-
ian.
III.   THE EMERGENCE OF LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING QUASI-MARITAL
CHILDREN
If the two categories described by Blackstone, “legitimate” and
“spurious or bastards,”49 were adequate for two hundred years, why
has a third category, containing at least three types of children,
emerged since the mid-1970s? Some religious and political commen-
tators suggest that these children are simply a manifestation of soci-
ety’s collapsing morals.50 Although there may be some truth in this
argument, courts and legislators have limited ability to address such
moral issues directly. This Article suggests that it is more productive
for legislators to look at changes in our socio-economic structure, the
recent development of genetic testing, and the common law’s long-
term failure when deciding whether the law should base paternal
rights and responsibilities primarily on biology or marriage—nature
or nurture.
                                                                                                                      
45. See FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1997).
46. See Department of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).
47. See generally Brashier, supra note 12, at 93 (discussing children’s inheritance
rights outside the traditional nuclear family).
48. See FLA. STAT. § 751.02 (1997).
49. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 434.
50. This moral argument also affects some scholarly presentations. See, e.g., David V.
Hadek, Why the Policy Behind the Irrebuttable Presumption of Paternity Will Never Die, 26
SW. U. L. REV. 359, 395 (1997) (stating that society’s growing concern for individuals’
rights has been a detriment to the marital family).
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A.   The Social, Economic, and Scientific Emergence of Quasi-Marital
Children
Socio-economic changes resulting in increased controversy con-
cerning quasi-marital children can be broadly described as a shift
from an agrarian society, in which the family unit was also the most
common business entity, to an urban society where the family is
rarely an important economic unit.51 Even at the beginning of this
century, before mechanized farming, divorce was rare. This was
partly true for moral and religious reasons, but also because the
family unit was essential to the survival of the farm and the small
business. The family business fed, housed, and clothed the children
and adults, and children were useful workers and an asset essen-
tially belonging to the marital father.52 A legal forum rarely existed
in which to litigate issues surrounding quasi-marital children, except
in the occasional divorce.53
As our country urbanized and our economy shifted away from the
family farm and small family business toward large corporations
with massive capital investments, the family unit was no longer as
essential for basic survival. In turn, children were more likely to be
seen as an economic liability.54 This shift contributed to a sizeable in-
                                                                                                                      
51. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 292-93 (1989)
(describing the shift as one from an economic family unit to an emotional support group for
individuals).
52. A father’s claim to a child is often expressly or implicitly described as a property
right. As recently as 1952, the Florida Supreme Court stated that a father had a “legal
property interest in the services of his child.” Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla.
1952). The influence of this property concept is most obvious in tort law. See United States
v. Dempsey, 635 So. 2d 961, 965 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a parent of a negligently injured
child has a right to recovery for the loss of filial consortium, including day-to-day services);
see also GROSSBERG, supra note 18, at 234-37; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns
the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995,
1036-50 (1992) (presenting an overview of the historical notion of children as property).
The shift in our view of children can also be seen in the evolution of the school year. His-
torically, schools started late enough each day to allow chores to be completed on the farm
and scheduled vacations to accommodate local agricultural needs. As children ceased to be
workers on the family farms and in the family businesses, the schools could develop far
more flexible schedules.
53. Florida has not retained official statistics on divorce prior to 1927. The rate per
1000 adults in the 1930s was between one and three. The rate went up dramatically dur-
ing the late 1930s and the years surrounding World War II. The rate stabilized at about
four per 1000 in the mid-1950s, and jumped to approximately seven per 1000 when no-
fault divorce became available in 1971. Interestingly, the rate has been relatively stable at
seven per 1000 since the mid-1970s. See INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, ATLAS OF
FLORIDA 151 (Edward A. Fernald & Elizabeth D. Purdum eds., 1992).
54. See generally CARL ABBOTT, THE NEW URBAN AMERICA: GROWTH AND POLITICS IN
THE SUNBELT CITIES (rev. ed. 1987) (discussing the overall social and economic changes of
urbanization in the southern United States).
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crease in divorce and “illegitimacy.”55 Child support became a major
national concern.56 Both dissolution and paternity proceedings cre-
ated legal fora in which parties had economic and emotional reasons
to litigate paternal rights and responsibilities for quasi-marital chil-
dren.
These socio-economic changes alone, however, would not have re-
sulted in the failure of the common law’s two-category system. Prior
to 1975, genetic science was in its infancy. Blood tests could exclude
the possibility of paternity in some instances, but they rarely could
identify the biological father. After some controversy, human leuko-
cyte antigen testing (HLA) became admissible evidence in paternity
actions in the mid-1970s.57 Suddenly, a court could identify biological
fathers with high statistical probability. Over the last twenty years,
improved genetic testing has permitted even more exact tissue typ-
ing. Any layperson who watches television knows that a simple test
of blood, saliva, or other human tissue can pinpoint a criminal or a
biological father.
B.   The Natural Law’s Tension Between Biology and Marriage
Improvements in genetic testing were the straw that broke the
back of the common law’s two-category system for classifying chil-
dren. The common law approach failed because of an unresolved ten-
sion between natural law rules favoring biology and similar rules fa-
voring the family unit as the source of paternal rights and responsi-
                                                                                                                      
55. The rate of nonmarital births per 1000 is commonly reported as increasing from
about seven in 1940 to 45 in 1993. VENTURA ET AL., THE DEMOGRAPHY OF OUT-OF-
WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING (U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 1995).
56. See BLANKENSHIP, supra note 32, at 124-47; Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolu-
tion in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 520
(1996); W. Craig Williams, Note, The Paradox of Paternity Establishment: As Rights Go
Up, Rates Go Down, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 261-62 (1997).
57. HLA testing was not permitted in Simons v. Jorg, 375 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979). Shortly thereafter, the author represented the biological father in a case in which
the HLA test was admitted. See Stratton v. McQueen, 389 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
There was considerable debate over the admissibility of genetic testing at that time. See
generally Jack P. Abbott et al., Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic
Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976-77); Leonard R. Jaffee,
Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other Statistical Evi-
dence: A Response to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457 (1978-79); Mark Edward Larson, Jr.,
Blood Test Exclusion Procedures in Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond, 13
J. FAM. L. 713 (1973-74); Paul I. Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity
Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1977-78); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial
by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971);
A.S. Wiener & W.W. Socha, Methods Available for Solving Medicolegal Problems of Dis-
puted Parentage, 21 J. FORENSIC SCI. 42 (1976). For a discussion of HLA testing after these
decisions, see Jean E. Maess, Admissibility, Weight and Sufficiency of Human Leukocyte
Antigen (HLA) Tissue Typing Tests in Paternity Cases, 37 A.L.R. 4th 167 (1985).
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bilities. This conflict arose because the natural law theories at and
before Blackstone’s time viewed both procreation and marriage as
“natural.”58
Common law judges in the Blackstone era almost certainly
wanted to provide families for quasi-marital children because they
saw families as desirable for such children and for the kingdom as a
whole.59 They were confronted, however, with long-standing social,
religious, and legal traditions granting fathers property rights to
children based, at least rhetorically, on biology. This conflict between
policies—those favoring families for children and those favoring the
“natural” or property rights of men—was not resolved during the
early common law era. Instead, it was avoided by a rigorous applica-
tion of the presumption of legitimacy60 and by the passage of bas-
tardy statutes. With the advent of admissible genetic testing, how-
ever, lawmakers can no longer avoid these two competing policies.
Courts and legislatures must now directly confront the unresolved
tension between biology and family in the field of paternal rights and
responsibilities.
On the biological side, natural law theory viewed paternal rights
as prepolitical, arising from a relationship that was entirely separate
from the power of the state but deserving of the state’s protection.61
The source of these rights was often expressed in biological terms.
Blackstone, for example, explained that a father’s willingness to sup-
                                                                                                                      
58. The tension is expressed in the writings of Samuel von Pufendorf. He explained:
1. From the marriage spring children, over whom parental authority has
been established,—the most ancient and at the same time the most sacred kind
of rule, under which children are bound to respect the commands and recognize
the superiority of parents.
2. The authority of parents over their children arises from two main causes:
first, because the natural law itself, in commanding man to be social, enjoined
upon parents the care of their children; and that this might not be neglected,
Nature at the same time implanted in them the tenderest affection for their
offspring. . . . And then that authority rests upon the tacit consent also of the
offspring. . . . Actually, however, the parents’ authority over their offspring is
established when they take up the child and nurture it, and undertake to form
it, to the best of their ability, into a fit member of human society.
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW
97 (Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682).
59. In 1829 Florida adopted the common law as it existed in England on July 4, 1776.
See Act effective Nov. 6, 1829, § 1, 1829 Fla. Laws 8, 8-9. This patriotic date is convenient
because it roughly aligns with the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England in 1765.
60. The presumption was apparently created before this era. See BLACKSTONE, supra
note 1, at 445 (presuming that a child born to a married couple was legitimate); POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 398-99.
61. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879, 886-90 (1984) (discussing the traditional parental rights doctrine and its rela-
tionship to natural law).
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port a child was because “providence” had provided for this by “im-
planting in the breast of every parent that natural . . . insuperable
degree of affection, which not even the deformity of person or mind
. . . can totally suppress or extinguish.”62 He argued that a man had
an obligation to provide for those “descended from his loins.”63
The concept of a “natural father” evolved from this biological in-
fluence. Although this term was used with relative infrequency prior
to 1950, judicial opinions and statutes now commonly refer to the
biological father or even the putative father as a “natural father.”64
This warm and fuzzy term is never defined,65 but it now provides sig-
nificant constitutional due process rights to biological or putative fa-
thers.66
Natural law theory viewed marriage as the source of paternal
rights. Both Blackstone and Pufendorf, an earlier natural law theo-
rist, assumed that a man would “naturally” marry the woman who
carried or would carry his child.67 The father’s rights and responsi-
bilities for the child arose from the contract of marriage or the natu-
ral family unit.
The natural law theory, however, was confronted by inexplicable
realities. For example, the natural law argument in favor of marital
fathers and their biological ties could not justify an obligation on the
part of the marital father to support a child who was clearly not the
                                                                                                                      
62. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 435.
63. Id. at 436.
64. See discussion supra note 11.
65. The term “natural father” is not even defined in Black’s Law Dictionary. See dis-
cussion supra note 11. Perhaps it is obvious that the term intends to identify the biological
father. On the other hand, natural law theory clearly wavered on whether the rights pos-
sessed by this man, as a member of a prepolitical human institution, were given to him
based on the act of sexual intercourse or the process of nurturing children within the fam-
ily unit. Given the use of this term in a constitutional context, the legal community should
pin down which act makes a natural father “natural.”
66. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (recognizing that a father’s due
process rights are afforded substantial protection when he demonstrates “full commitment”
to active participation in parenting); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (hold-
ing that the “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard in a parental rights termination
proceeding violated the parent’s due process rights); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
394 (1979) (stating that a New York statute allowing unwed mothers, but not unwed fa-
thers, to block adoption by withholding consent violated the Equal Protection Clause);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (noting that the due process rights of an un-
wed father were not violated by the child’s adoption by a stepfather when the unwed father
never had, nor sought, actual custody of the child); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648
(1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires a parent, even an unwed father, to be
granted a hearing before terminating parental rights); see also Hadek, supra note 50, at
363-74 (discussing the legal history and cases from Stanley to Lehr); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406-07 (1995) (examining
various legal theories concerning the parent-child relationship).
67. See supra note 58. Relying on Montesquieu, Blackstone saw the “establishment of
marriage in all civilized states” as “built on this natural obligation of the father to provide
for his children.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 435.
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biological product of the marriage. This problem was avoided, but not
solved, by the presumption of legitimacy, which gave families to chil-
dren (or children to marital fathers) without regard to biology. The
natural law argument in favor of biological fathers also failed to ex-
plain why so many nonmarital children could not rely on their bio-
logical fathers for support. This problem was partly ameliorated by
bastardy statutes providing support for nonmarital children.
C.   The Presumption of Legitimacy: Quietly Upholding the Family
Unit Over Biology
The presumption of legitimacy presumes that a child of a mar-
riage is a marital child.68 At common law, this presumption was
aided by Lord Mansfield’s Rule, which prohibited either a husband or
a wife from testifying that a child born during the marriage was not
the marital father’s child.69 These rules appear to be, and arguably
are, procedural or evidentiary rules. In a court of law, the husband
may overcome this presumption, but only with satisfactory evidence
before he can divest himself of the duty to maintain a child.70 The
level of proof required to overcome this presumption was extremely
high,71 especially since the wife and husband were prohibited from
testifying and the biological father’s testimony would have been a
confession of a serious criminal offense.72 In these instances, the pre-
sumption was effectively substantive law, requiring a husband to
raise all children born to a marriage. The common law indirectly an-
nounced and implemented a policy that children need families,
homes, heritage, and inheritance more than biological fathers need
rights or even responsibilities.73
                                                                                                                      
68. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 16 So. 2d 163, 163-64 (Fla. 1944) (stating that if the child
is born during a marriage, the husband must overcome a presumption of legitimacy in or-
der for the child to be “bastardized”).
69. Lord Mansfield’s Rule stated, “[I]t is a rule, founded in decency, morality and pol-
icy, that [the father or mother] shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that . . . [their]
offspring is spurious.” Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777).
70. See Eldridge, 16 So. 2d at 163-64 (stating that a husband may overcome the pre-
sumption of legitimacy, but only with “sufficiently strong” testimony).
71. See id. The standard was less than the criminal “reasonable doubt” standard but
similar to the modern “clear and convincing” standard. Indeed, in Privette, the court
translated the older concept that the presumption “will not fail unless common sense and
reason are outraged” into a standard requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence. De-
partment of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 309 (Fla. 1993).
72. See discussion supra note 41.
73. The author does not necessarily maintain that the common law’s creators ex-
pressly intended to create laws establishing families for children. Perhaps the male judges
who announced these rules simply saw the husband’s “possession” of the child as nine-
tenths of the law justifying rights and responsibilities. The effect, however, was a body of
law that gave virtually all children born into a marriage a definite family from birth.
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This indirect approach to establishing paternity allowed the mari-
tal rights prong of the natural law to prevail without discussing and
eliminating the rhetoric of biology or the concepts of natural fathers
and legitimacy. We often become trapped by our own rhetoric, and
the presumption of legitimacy proved to create such a trap. This pre-
sumption demonstrates the danger of disguising substantive law as
procedural law.
After genetic testing developed, any interested party could over-
come the presumption of legitimacy. Suddenly, legitimacy yielded to
genetics and thus biology. One suspects that neither Blackstone nor
Pufendorf would “naturally” have given substantive or procedural
due process rights to a father who was no more than a momentary
participant in a casual act of sexual intercourse. Nevertheless, with-
out actually intending to select biological fathers over marital fathers
to serve either as functional or support fathers for quasi-marital
children, the common law was logically postured to give rights and
impose responsibilities upon biological fathers.
Although this “ancient” history may seem irrelevant to today’s
policy-makers, it is important to understand that the judiciary is
bound by its common law roots. The common law never abandoned
natural rights concepts for biological fathers of quasi-marital chil-
dren, even long after the presumption had accomplished that practi-
cal effect. As a result, especially in a technological society with a high
rate of divorce, it will now be very difficult for the judiciary, relying
upon the common law, to return to the substantive law concealed
within the historic presumption of legitimacy, a law providing family
units for children. The judiciary can no longer consistently select
marital fathers as legal fathers, now that the presumption of legiti-
macy can be regularly overcome by scientific testing. If we wish to
further the real policies promoted by the presumption of legitimacy,
in whole or in part, we must create new substantive law either judi-
cially, on a case-by-case basis, or legislatively in a more structured
format.
D.   Bastardy and Paternity: Support Rather than Parentage
At common law, a biological father had no legal obligation to sup-
port a nonmarital child. Bastardy statutes were enacted to require
biological fathers to support nonmarital children if they did not do so
“naturally.”74 These statutes were not formally adopted as part of
                                                                                                                      
74. See Bartlett, supra note 61, at 963 n.196. This is interesting in light of the com-
mon law’s reliance on natural law theory. Instead of having an obligation to support his
biological children, a man had an obligation to support his marital children. This is an-
other example of the extent to which the common law used natural law terminology but did
not implement its biological theory. If it is “natural” for biological fathers to support their
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Florida’s common law,75 but Florida created its own comparable
quasi-criminal bastardy act prior to statehood in 1828.76 These stat-
utes, however, have complicated the judiciary’s effort to preserve the
substantive policies of the presumption of legitimacy.
Bastardy statutes were designed to obtain support for nonmarital
children from men who were violating the laws of nature; however,
they were not designed to resolve the problems of marital or quasi-
marital children. Nevertheless, the Legislature made cosmetic
amendments to these statutes that attempted to transform them into
statutes addressing the needs of quasi-marital children.
In 1975 the words “bastard” and “illegitimate” were removed from
chapter 742, Florida Statutes, and the Legislature changed the chap-
ter’s title to “Determination of Paternity.”77 In 1983 the Legislature
amended this statute again to permit a married woman to bring an
action for determination of paternity.78 In 1986 the Legislature first
allowed an action to be filed by a putative father.79 Thus, it is only re-
cently that the statute has become a tool for examining situations in-
volving quasi-marital children.
An overall examination of the parentage chapter reveals that it
has retained its bastardy heritage, and it is not well designed to re-
solve the current issues involving quasi-marital children. The chap-
ter does not recognize quasi-marital children as a distinct third cate-
gory. To the extent that it recognizes these children, chapter 742
treats them as if they were nonmarital children. As the examination
of Privette will reveal, it is simply impossible to resolve parentage is-
sues by relying on the judicial concept of “legal father” under statu-
tory provisions designed to find only a biological father as a matter of
paternity. Chapter 742 currently provides no foundation or proce-
dures to select a marital father over a biological father in the case of
a quasi-marital child.
                                                                                                                      
children, then bastardy statutes were quasi-criminal statutes to punish what were consid-
ered “unnatural” acts.
75. The specific English statutes in 1776 that concerned bastardy were not adopted
under section 2.01, Florida Statutes. See Report of Leslie A. Thompson under Act of De-
cember 27, 1845, in Volume 1 of the Florida Statutes Annotated.
76. See Act effective Jan. 5, 1828, § 1, 1828 Fla. Laws 32, 32.
77. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1975, ch. 75-166, § 5, 1975 Fla. Laws 298, 301 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1975)). In 1993 the Florida Legislature changed the chapter’s title
back to “Determination of Parentage,” but the statutes within the chapter still concern “de-
termination of paternity.” Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 742 (Supp. 1992) with FLA. STAT. ch.
742 (1993).
78. See Act effective June 24, 1983, ch. 83-214, § 13, 1983 Fla. Laws 845, 849 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1983)).
79. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1986, ch. 86-220, §§ 150-54, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1723-27
(codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 742.011-.12 (Supp. 1986)).
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After 1975 the remnants of the presumption of legitimacy encour-
aged judges to grant rights and responsibilities to the marital father.
However, when biological fatherhood was established as a scientific
fact, neither the common law nor chapter 742 gave the judiciary an
adequate means of replacing the biological father with the marital
father. As a result, post-1975 case law addressing quasi-marital chil-
dren is inconsistent and confusing. Without a third category of chil-
dren, recognized either by statute or case law, one would expect
courts to treat quasi-marital children like marital children and, on
other occasions, like nonmarital children without a set of controlling
rules. Despite the Florida Supreme Court’s best intentions, Privette
and Daniel fulfill these expectations.
Both Privette and Daniel involved mothers seeking support for
their quasi-marital children. In both cases, neither the biological fa-
thers nor the marital fathers were likely to serve as functional fa-
thers. In Privette, the mother filed a chapter 742 paternity proceed-
ing seeking child support from the marital father without joining the
biological father.80 In Daniel, the mother sought support from the
marital father in a divorce proceeding, in which the biological father
was not a true party.81 The court’s heavy reliance upon the presump-
tion of legitimacy in Privette did not promote the selection of a stable
family unit or locate a source of support. Moreover, in Daniel, the
court’s reliance on paternity concepts not only failed to provide a
source of support but also neglected to consider the child’s need for a
family unit. Each case creates serious procedural and substantive
problems that call out for major legislative or judicial reform.
IV.   PRIVETTE V. DEPARTMENT OF HRS: AN EXPANSIVE READING OF
CHAPTER 742, FLORIDA STATUTES, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF
CHILDREN
In Privette v. Department of HRS,82 the State filed a paternity ac-
tion against Mr. Privette on behalf of Mrs. Sease and her child.83
While Mrs. Sease sought paternity determination, the award of child
support, and other costs, the form complaint contained no allegations
specific to the case except for Mrs. Sease’s name, Mr. Privette’s
name, and limited information about the child.84 The standard form
                                                                                                                      
80. See Privette v. Department of HRS, 585 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), aff’d
and remanded for further proceedings, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).
81. See Daniel v. Daniel, 681 So. 2d 849, 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), aff’d, 695 So. 2d
1253 (Fla. 1997).
82. 585 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
83. See id. at 365.
84. See id.
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incorrectly stated that the child was born out-of-wedlock.85 Mrs.
Sease apparently filed a motion to obtain HLA testing from Mr.
Privette, and he objected. To aid in resolving the objection, the par-
ties filed a short stipulation containing all of the facts known in the
case.86
Mrs. Sease gave birth to the child in October 1989.87 She conceived
and delivered the child during her marriage to Mr. Sease, making
the child a Type II or III quasi-marital child.88 Surprisingly, the rec-
ord contains no factual information describing the marital relation-
ship between Mr. and Mrs. Sease.89 One assumes from reading the
briefs that the couple had been separated when she filed this peti-
tion, but no record information to support that assumption exists.90
Further, no birth certificate is in the record, but the parties stipu-
lated that Mr. Sease is shown as the father on the birth certificate.
At the trial court hearing, no one argued that the State should be
suing Mr. Sease, the marital father, for child support. The parties
merely argued the propriety of a blood test.91 The court ordered Mr.
Privette to submit to a blood test, and he petitioned the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal for certiorari review of that order.92  The narrow
issue before the Second District was whether a putative father had
standing to raise the presumption of legitimacy in a paternity pro-
ceeding to delay or prevent a compulsory HLA blood test.93 The Sec-
ond District announced conflict with the First District Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                      
85. See id. The author sat on the panel of judges deciding this case in the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. The record is still intact at the court.
86. The stipulations are not reported in the opinions. See Stipulated Facts, Depart-
ment of HRS v. Privette, No. 90-1521 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1991).
87. In both Privette and Daniel, the name of the child is contained in the record. This
Article will not disclose the children’s names. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.146(e) (stating that
children are referred to by initials in traditional termination proceedings).
88. Mrs. Sease was still married to Mr. Sease at the time of the discovery hearing. See
Stipulated Facts ¶ 1, HRS v. Privette, No. 90-1521 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1991).
89. The facts as reported in Privette are extremely limited because the case came to
the Second District Court of Appeal in 1991 as a certiorari petition involving a discovery
dispute and contained no depositions or evidentiary hearings.
90. Even at the time the Florida Supreme Court gave its opinion, Mr. Privette’s at-
torney, Daniel A. David, knew little about Mr. Sease. Mr. David closed his practice shortly
thereafter and relocated to Tallahassee. Stephen F. Ellis undertook Mr. Privette’s repre-
sentation. On remand, the State amended the complaint to include Mr. Sease as a party
but never served him. Mrs. Sease may have moved from the state. The action was never
resolved. Interview with Daniel A. David, Att’y, and Stephen F. Ellis, Att’y (Oct. 1997).
91. See Privette, 585 So. 2d at 365.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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peal in Pitcairn v. Vowell94 and held that the putative father could
raise the presumption.95
In an effort to balance the putative father’s rights of privacy and
the best interests of the child, the Second District Court of Appeal
required a “threshold showing that the complaint is brought in good
faith and is likely to be supported by reliable evidence,” prior to en-
tering an order compelling a genetic test in any paternity proceeding
filed pursuant to chapter 742.96 If a case involved a child whose mari-
tal father was listed on the birth certificate, the court additionally
required a determination of whether “the child’s interests [would] be
adversely affected by allowing a party to circumvent that presump-
tion.”97 Specific trial procedures were not discussed in any great de-
tail; instead, the court simply quashed the order compelling a blood
test and remanded the case for further proceedings.98 Significantly,
the court did not use the phrase “legal father” in its opinion, nor did
it use the phrase “natural father.”
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction in Privette to re-
solve the express conflict between Privette and Pitcairn99 and ap-
proved the Second District’s decision.100 The court’s decision, how-
ever, went far beyond Privette’s narrow discovery issue. In dicta,
which was written as the holding, the court announced the concept of
a “legal father” and provided a complex procedure by which the mari-
tal father’s status as legal father could be terminated, shifting the
mantle of legal father to the biological father.101 The court clearly
contemplated situations in which the marital father would remain
the legal father if in the best interests of the child, even after litiga-
tion determined paternity in another man.102
The complex two-phase procedure for shifting legal father status
from the marital father to the biological father requires some expla-
nation. The Florida Supreme Court held that before ordering a blood
test, the trial court must hear arguments from “the parties, including
the legal father if he wishes to appear and a guardian ad litem ap-
pointed to represent the child.”103 This hearing, however, is not
                                                                                                                      
94. 580 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that the “putative father does
not have standing to raise the presumption of legitimacy in avoidance of the potential or-
dering of support for the child”).
95. See Privette, 585 So. 2d at 366.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv) (stating that the Florida Supreme Court can
accept jurisdiction when a conflict exists between two or more district courts of appeal).
100. See Department of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 309 (Fla. 1993).
101. Id. at 307.
102. See id. at 308.
103. Id.
242 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:219
merely a time for legal argument. The party seeking the HLA test is
required to prove the following: (1) the complaint is apparently fac-
tually accurate; (2) the complaint is “brought in good faith and is
likely to be supported by reliable evidence; and (3) the child’s best in-
terests will be better served even if the test later proves the child’s
factual illegitimacy.”104 Even if the putative father in the paternity
proceeding admits he is the biological father, the opinion implies that
a blood test could be denied. Thus, if the party fails to establish this
initial burden, a paternity action could be dismissed without an ad-
judication of paternity on the merits. The court states that “in a real
sense, the trial court ordering the blood test must decide one of the
ultimate issues: whether the child’s best interests will be served by
being declared illegitimate and having parental rights transferred to
the biological father.”105
Following this hearing on the discovery issue, if the trial court or-
ders a genetic test and it shows that the putative father is the bio-
logical father, Privette provides for another hearing. The opinion
states that “if a test shows that [the] Respondent is the child’s bio-
logical father, this fact without more does not constitute grounds to
grant a paternity petition.”106 In a footnote, the court states that “the
mere fact of a blood test establishing the putative natural father’s
paternity does not in itself result in a legal declaration of illegitimacy
or a legal termination of the legal father’s parental rights.”107 Privette
contemplates that at the final hearing, the trial court will decide,
based upon an ad hoc best interests analysis,108 whether or not to
terminate the current legal father’s parental rights and shift those
rights and responsibilities to the biological father. The court provides
no structured guidelines or set of factors for this determination, and
none exists in chapter 742 or elsewhere in the Florida Statutes.
The concept of a legal father, when used as a method to select
functional or support fathers for quasi-marital children, has enor-
mous potential. Furthermore, the notion that legal father status
could be shifted from one man to another is an exciting idea. How-
ever, the Privette opinion rapidly proved unsatisfactory, both for
practical procedural reasons and because its substantive concepts
had so little support in existing law.109
                                                                                                                      
104. Id.
105. Id. at 309.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 307 n.2.
108. See id. at 309.
109. See Kimberly G. Montanari, Does the Presumption of Legitimacy Actually Protect
the Best Interests of the Child?, 24 STETSON L. REV. 809, 842 (1995) (arguing that Privette
should only apply in contested paternity cases that implicate the presumption of legiti-
macy).
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A.   Procedural Problems
The practical procedural problems after Privette centered on three
broad issues. First, it was unclear whether Privette procedures ap-
plied only in paternity actions or also in divorce proceedings. Second,
there were few guardians available and willing to accept these cases
in many circuits, and no one knew what the scope of their work
should entail. Finally, jurisdictional issues arose because the marital
father was not a party in Privette.110
While Privette adopted the two-part procedure for use “in cases of
this type,”111 disputes quickly arose concerning the range of cases
within the category.112 Did the procedure apply only in paternity ac-
tions filed under chapter 742, or did it apply in divorce actions filed
under chapter 61 as well? District courts of appeal applied the proce-
dure in divorce proceedings, but not without considerable uncer-
tainty.113 Many, if not most, circuit court judges assumed that
Privette must be followed in any divorce in which a quasi-marital
child was revealed in the pleadings.
Interestingly, an argument could have been made that Privette
only applied to paternity actions filed by the State seeking reim-
                                                                                                                      
110. These problems are not discussed to any extent in published documents. In 1996
and 1997, The author participated in continuing judicial education programs with Florida
circuit court judges who must address Privette issues at trial. These judges commonly
voiced concerns regarding these issues.
111. Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308 (referring to “quasi-marital children”).
112. See Montanari, supra note 109, at 835.
113. For example, in one Florida case, the court required a guardian to represent a
“Type II quasi-marital child” in a divorce. See Alchin v. Alchin, 667 So. 2d 477, 479 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1996). In Alchin, the boyfriend intervened in the divorce after he and the mother had
obtained a blood test without the marital father’s knowledge. The marital father sought to
remain the legal father. See id. By invoking Privette, the district court recognized the pos-
sibility that the status of legal father could be shifted to another man. See id. at 479-80. In
Ownby v. Ownby, 639 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), the court reached a similar result in
a divorce where the husband sought custody of all six of the couple’s children, the youngest
being a possible “quasi-marital child.” Judge Griffin’s separate opinion voices concerns as
to joining putative fathers in divorce actions. See id. at 139 (concurring in part; dissenting
in part). In White v. White, 661 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), the court reviewed on cer-
tiorari a nonfinal order in a divorce proceeding. The marital father, who had proof that he
was not the biological father of a “Type I quasi-marital child,” sought a determination of
paternity in the divorce. See id. The trial court denied his request without appointing a
guardian. See id. The district court remanded, requiring that appointment of a guardian
and, apparently, a determination of paternity and parentage be made. See id. at 940-41.
Note that White is identical to Daniel, except that the mother in White did not concede the
accuracy of the 0% blood test. Finally, in Robinson v. State, 661 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA
1995), the district court declined to require a guardian in a paternity action because the
marital father had been determined not to be the biological father in a pre-Privette divorce.
The putative father was not allowed to challenge the elimination of the child’s legal father
even though the legal father had been eliminated in a proceeding to which he was not a
party and in which it did not appear that the child had a guardian. See id. Under White, a
guardian would have been necessary in the Robinson divorce proceeding if the divorce had
occurred just a few months later.
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bursement of welfare benefits. In the opening paragraphs of the
Privette opinion, the court emphasizes the impropriety of the State
interfering in the family unit and “impugning the legitimacy of a
child for the sake of money allegedly owed to the State of Florida.”114
Although the court was clearly influenced by this factor, it is doubtful
that Privette’s holding could have been limited to Title IV-D actions,
or that those actions are primarily to benefit the State.115
1.   Guardian Ad Litem
The circuit courts’ broad interpretation of Privette compounded
problems concerning guardians ad litem. If the child must be repre-
sented by a guardian ad litem, and the child or the guardian is “an
indispensable party” to the Privette proceeding,116 then the courts
need a larger supply of guardians. Chapter 742 contains no statutory
provisions for guardians and, unlike chapter 61, contains no express
immunity for their activities.117 Guardians ad litem are generally
volunteers and, even prior to Privette, were already in scarce supply
to perform their statutorily mandated tasks.118 After Privette, divorce
and paternity cases involving quasi-marital children languished in
some circuits because of the requirement that a guardian be ap-
pointed.119
Even when guardians were available, volunteers were hesitant to
serve without immunity when it was unclear what the guardian
should determine or evaluate prior to the first or second hearing. For
example, if one of the goals of the first hearing was to protect the pu-
tative father’s privacy rights, it was questionable whether the
guardian should interview his family, friends, and employer. On the
other hand, these interviews may be essential to resolving the merits
of the issues under the heightened burden of proof used at the hear-
ing on the discovery issue. Chapter 742 was designed to place a name
on the child’s birth certificate, not to shift names on a birth certifi-
cate. It provided no guidelines to the guardians. As a result, some
circuit judges decided that the risks and problems associated with
                                                                                                                      
114. Privette, 617 So. 2d at 307.
115. See FLA. STAT. § 409.2561(1) (1997) (giving priority to the state for the establish-
ment of support even in public assistance cases).
116. Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308 n.5.
117. See FLA. STAT. § 61.405 (1997).
118. See In re E.F., 639 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (noting that the trial court
did not “fundamentally” err when it attempted to locate a guardian ad litem but was un-
able to do so because of the inadequate supply of volunteers).
119. See White v. White, 661 So. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (stating that the trial
court was in no position to rule on the paternity issue absent a guardian ad litem to protect
the child’s best interests).
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these cases required that the guardians be lawyers.120 In larger juris-
dictions, it quickly became apparent that Privette could not be effec-
tively administered without at least a few trained professional
guardians ad litem paid by the state.
It is important to realize that the procedures in Privette might be
workable but not in the existing statutory framework. These proce-
dures need funded, professional guardians with specific “best inter-
ests” guidelines. The guardians should be used conservatively and
sparingly as needed, not as an essential participant in every case.
2.   Personal Jurisdiction
Privette also raised personal jurisdiction issues. In Privette, Mr.
Sease, the marital, legal father, was not a party to the lawsuit. The
record does not reflect where he lived or whether the court had a ba-
sis to exercise jurisdiction over his person. It seems odd that the
court discussed terminating a man’s status as a “legal father” when
he was not a true party to the proceeding. Yet, the court stated, “The
legal father must be given notice of the hearing either actually if he
is available or constructively if otherwise; and he must be heard if he
wishes to argue personally or through counsel.”121 The court suggests
that this proceeding could result in “a legal termination of the legal
father’s parental rights.”122
Parental rights are usually terminated in a chapter 39 “Termina-
tion of Parental Rights” proceeding123 or occasionally in a chapter 63
adoption proceeding.124 Termination requires that the legal father be
a named party in the action. In a chapter 39 proceeding, the legal fa-
ther is entitled to free legal representation if he is indigent, and he is
given many opportunities to preserve his rights to his children.125 It
seems inconceivable that a court could remove a person’s name from
a child’s birth certificate and thereby terminate parental rights in a
proceeding in which the parent is not a party. Likewise, it seems in-
conceivable that the biological father could be designated the legal
                                                                                                                      
120. The author has encouraged this precaution at continuing judicial education semi-
nars.
121. Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308 n.4.
122. Id. at 307.
123. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.46, 63.072(1) (1997). Technically, a parent who has aban-
doned a child waives the right to consent to the adoption, but the judgment has the effect
of relieving this parent of all parental rights and responsibilities. See id. § 63.172.
124. See id. § 63.172.
125. See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980) (holding that the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and the Florida Constitutions require the court to
appoint counsel to an indigent parent in termination proceedings).
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father unless he was personally served and became subject to the
court’s jurisdiction.126
Rules for personal and constructive service of process need to be
established with clear requirements as to the parties who must par-
ticipate in the proceeding. The parentage proceeding under the sec-
ond prong of Privette must be separate and distinct from a biological
determination of paternity. Also, the proceeding must be separate
from any related dissolution proceeding to prevent divorces from
stalling because of an inadequate supply of guardians or a lack of ju-
risdiction over putative fathers.
B.   Substantive Problems
The assumption that a legal father was intended to be at least a
support father was buttressed by the Florida Supreme Court’s strik-
ing decision to categorize as a constitutional right, the child’s right to
legitimacy and, thus, to a marital father as a legal father.127 The
Privette court stated, “Once children are born legitimate, they have a
right to maintain that status both factually and legally if doing so is
in their best interests.”128
One wonders whether the court intended this right to be a sub-
stantive or a procedural due process right. Presumably, the court did
not base this right on a deprivation of life. Is it based on a property
right or a liberty right? The court does not enlighten its reader. Even
for those who believe children should have greater rights independ-
ent of their parents, it is difficult to argue that these rights emanate
from the due process provision of the 1968 Florida Constitution.
The substantive problems with Privette demonstrate the courts’
struggle to uphold the “best interests” function of the presumption of
legitimacy in a world of genetic testing. The supreme court’s concern
with “legitimacy” and the “stigma of illegitimacy” can hardly be over-
stated, as those ideas are discussed repeatedly throughout the opin-
ion.129 However, rather than focus on the presumption of legitimacy
as a tool to provide the child with a stable family unit, as argued in
                                                                                                                      
126. Constructive service of process is not authorized in Florida for use in a paternity
action. See FLA. STAT. § 48.011 (1997); Drucker v. Fernandez, 288 So. 2d 283, 283 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1974). Constructive service in parental terminations was first authorized as recently
as 1994. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1994, ch. 94-164, § 45, 1994 Fla. Laws 963, 1015 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. § 49.011(13) (1993)).
127. See Privette, 617 So. 2d at 307.
128. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9). Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution is
the state counterpart to the Federal Due Process Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether a child has such a liberty interest. See,
e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (“We have never had occasion to de-
cide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in main-
taining her filial relationship.”).
129. Privette, 617 So. 2d at 307.
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this Article, Privette describes the presumption as a “policy of pro-
tecting the welfare of the child.”130 Admittedly, a stable family unit is
good for a child’s welfare, but the presumption was designed to select
a family for a child, not to give the court leeway to do whatever is
“best” for a child. Once the court transforms the presumption of le-
gitimacy into a process of doing what is best for a child, genetics can
no longer overcome the presumption.
On the other hand, legitimacy has little or no definition once this
occurs. The court had to create the concept of a legal father because
it was no longer presuming that the marital father was the biological
father. Florida law, however, does not provide any clear definition of
the rights and responsibilities of a “legal father,” nor does it contain
any statutory basis to place permanent obligations on the man listed
on a birth certificate. Furthermore, Florida law does not provide any
adequate constitutional theory to support the Privette court’s claim
that a child has a constitutional right to legitimacy and thus a legal
father.
In Florida, the concept of legal father had a very limited history
prior to Privette.131 “Legal father” is not a statutory term and was not
used for any specific purpose in earlier case law. The Privette opinion
defines a legal father as “the one listed on the birth certificate.”132
The father on a birth certificate is established as a matter of vital
statistics pursuant to section 382.013(2), Florida Statutes.133 Under
this statute, the name of the marital father is automatically placed
on the birth certificate, absent a rare prior judicial determination
that some other man is the father.134
Because this procedure is automatic, the marital father does not
consent to his name being placed on the certificate. Any obligation
that results from this process is imposed on him by case law and not
by any voluntary act. At least in the absence of a statute making le-
gal fatherhood a consequence of the marital contract, this obligation
cannot be viewed as contractual, quasi-contractual, or a product of
estoppel, and is certainly not “natural.”
The presumption of legitimacy under the common law never made
the marital father a legal father. It made him a presumptive father.
Prior to Privette, most children, including marital children, had no
legally established father. On its face, Privette appears to treat a
birth certificate, which is prepared with little judicial or administra-
tive oversight, similar to an order of adoption, an order of surrogate
                                                                                                                      
130. Id.
131. See supra note 13.
132. Privette, 617 So. 2d at 307.
133. See FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2) (Supp. 1998).
134. See id.
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parentage, or an order of paternity.135 Perhaps this is too literal a
reading of Privette, and the supreme court intended the marital fa-
ther to be only a presumptive legal father.136
If the marital father is the automatic legal father, what rights and
responsibilities did the Privette court intend to place upon this fa-
ther? Because the court started “from the premise that the presump-
tion of legitimacy is based on the policy of protecting the welfare of
the child, i.e., the policy of advancing the best interests of the
child,”137 many lawyers and judges assumed that “legitimacy” enti-
tled the child to a “legal father” having all the rights and responsi-
bilities traditionally vested in a legal guardian.
When Privette returned to the trial court, it withered on the vine.
Ultimately, the State did not obtain reimbursements from either fa-
ther, and the child obtained neither a family unit nor a future right
of support.138 Applying a best interest test to establish a legal father,
at least as a support father, was a failure for the child. The court’s
reasoning pushed the common law rules beyond logic where genetic
evidence would likely overcome the traditional presumption of le-
gitimacy. The supreme court clearly struggled for a fair outcome and
a reasonable rule, but the common law provided no foundation on
which to base a satisfactory opinion.
V.   DANIEL V. DANIEL: A RETREAT TO TRADITIONAL RULES THAT MAY
DISADVANTAGE EVEN MARITAL CHILDREN
Four years after Privette, the Florida Supreme Court was given
the opportunity to clarify some of the problems Privette created and
to explain the type of cases in which Privette’s procedures should be
applied.139 In Daniel, the supreme court limited Privette’s procedures
by holding that Privette does not apply in divorces where the issue of
                                                                                                                      
135. If the birth certificate actually made the marital father the legal father, the doc-
trine of fatherhood by estoppel would not be necessary. See Wade v. Wade, 536 So. 2d 1158,
1159-60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (estopping a former husband from “disavowing [a] child as his
own for purposes of parental support”); Marshall v. Marshall, 386 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1980) (stating that the child’s best interests would not be served by allowing the hus-
band to disavow his prior recognition of paternity). There would be no need to estop the
marital father from denying his biological fatherhood if his status as legal father were
fixed and permanent by virtue of the birth certificate.
136. The author is indebted to Professor Iris Burke of the University of Florida, College
of Law, who provided many constructive suggestions during the writing of this Article. She
first suggested this very reasonable interpretation of Privette. The supreme court probably
views the legal father as a presumptive category, allowing the doctrine of fatherhood by es-
toppel to continue to exist. It also makes the result in Daniel more compatible with
Privette.
137. Privette, 617 So. 2d at 307.
138. Interview with Daniel A David, Att’y, and Stephen F. Ellis, Att’y (Oct. 1997).
139. See Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1997).
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paternity is uncontested,140 and thereby reduced the demand for
guardians ad litem. However, Daniel did not clarify the other proce-
dural problems that Privette created. By treating the putative bio-
logical father as if he were a party to the action when he was not,
Daniel muddied the issues surrounding personal jurisdiction even
further. More importantly, Daniel made a paper fiction out of the
child’s constitutional right to legitimacy—to a legal father. Ironically,
by relying on the concept of paternity, which was created to provide
support for nonmarital children, Daniel gave a child both a legal,
marital father and a putative, biological father, but no meaningful
right of support from either. The outcome in Daniel may be entirely
fair for Mr. Daniel, but the analysis will place the best interests of
children at risk.
A.   Confusion of Legitimacy and Paternity
Prior to Daniel, many lawyers and judges believed that a child
could be deprived of the legitimacy right announced in Privette only
after the court, with a guardian’s help, decided that the child would
be better off if the paternal rights and responsibilities were shifted to
the biological father. If legitimacy was the child’s constitutional right
as the Privette court decided, then the marital father should not be
able to voluntarily relinquish his status as legal father, unless that
decision benefited the child.141 Otherwise, the child’s due process
right to a marital father would compete in some unspecified fashion
with the biological father’s due process rights.142
In 1992 Mrs. Daniel became pregnant at nineteen years old.143 The
day after Christmas, she married Mr. Daniel, whom she had met
while working at a drugstore. Mr. Daniel knew his wife was pregnant
at the time he married her. He also knew he was not the child’s bio-
logical father. Mr. Daniel consulted an attorney prior to the mar-
riage, but the record does not reflect what, if any, advice the attorney
provided. The couple did not execute a prenuptial agreement. The
Daniels’ baby was born in March 1993 and, therefore, fell into the
                                                                                                                      
140. See id. at 1255.
141. Neither parent may voluntarily abandon a child in a state-initiated parental ter-
mination proceeding unless termination is in the child’s manifest best interests. See FLA.
STAT. § 39.4611(1)(c) (1997). Thus, it is logical that a parent cannot relinquish rights in a
Privette hearing without consideration of the child’s interests.
142. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that parents who
are party to a state-initiated termination of parental rights proceeding are entitled to due
process).
143. See Petitioner’s Initial Brief app. at 2, Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d 1253 (Fla.
1997) (No. 89, 363). The facts in Daniel are not described in detail in the published opin-
ions. The statement of the facts in this section is derived from the appellate briefs and from
the guardian ad litem’s written report to the trial court.
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Type I quasi-marital child category. Mr. Daniel fully participated in
the pregnancy and birth and allowed his name to be placed on the
birth certificate.144
Less than six months from the child’s birth, the couple developed
marital difficulties and separated in November 1993. In the divorce
proceeding, Mrs. Daniel admitted that Mr. Daniel was not the bio-
logical father of her daughter. The trial court assumed that it was
bound to follow Privette.145 Accordingly, the court appointed a guard-
ian ad litem, an attorney skilled in marital law.
The guardian ad litem interviewed the Daniels and their respec-
tive parents, and also deposed the putative father, Mr. Staggers.146
From the guardian ad litem’s investigation, it appeared that Mr.
Daniel had a good job with a regional drugstore chain and had a net
monthly income of approximately $1500. He bonded with his legal
daughter during the six- to eight-month period in which he lived with
her, and loved and supported her like any good marital father.147
The investigation further revealed that the putative father lived
approximately fifty miles away and that he was on probation for mi-
nor felony offenses.148 Mr. Staggers was living with a woman and was
the admitted biological father of her four-month-old daughter. He
was also supporting her older daughter from a prior relationship. He
lived in a trailer and made about $7.25 per hour as a cook. He had no
contact with the Daniels’ little girl, did not formally admit that the
child was biologically his, and had no interest in supporting the child
either emotionally or monetarily.149
The guardian ad litem filed a report recommending that Mr.
Daniel remain the girl’s legal father.150 In November 1995 the trial
                                                                                                                      
144. See id. app. at 3.
145. The trial judge was following a procedure that the author recommended to the
trial bench in a continuing judicial education program in May 1996. See Chris W. Alten-
bernd, Privette’s Puzzle: The Shifting Legal Father, Advanced Judicial Studies (May 1996)
(on file with Office of the State Courts Adm’r, Tallahassee, Fla.).
146. Although Mr. and Mrs. Daniel agreed that Mr. Staggers was the biological father,
no testing was done. Thus, he cannot be accurately described as a biological father.
The putative biological father, Mr. Staggers, was never a true party to this divorce pro-
ceeding. Third parties are a rarity in divorce. Although both the Second District and the
Florida Supreme Court referred to Mr. Staggers as a party, he participated only to the ex-
tent that he honored the guardian ad litem’s witness subpoena.
The Second District Court of Appeal’s opinion states that “the trial court . . . made the
biological father a party to the proceedings.” Daniel v. Daniel, 681 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1996). The court then explains in a footnote that he only participated to the extent
that his deposition was taken. See id. at n.1. In fact, he was never shown in the style of the
case as a party nor were pleadings filed that described him as a party. See id. The supreme
court describes him similarly. See Daniel, 695 So. 2d at 1254.
147. See Petitioner’s Initial Brief app. at 1, Daniel (No. 89, 363).
148. See id. app. at 4.
149. See id. app. at 5.
150. See id. app. at 1.
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court determined that it was not in the child’s best interests for the
court to shift the legal father status from Mr. Daniel to Mr. Stag-
gers.151 Accordingly, the court did not enter an order requiring a
blood test and ordered Mr. Daniel to pay child support of $520 per
month.152 Mr. Daniel, of course, could establish visitation and ex-
panded custody rights if he desired.
At the intermediate appellate stage, Mr. Daniel challenged his
obligation to provide support.153 The Second District struggled with
this case because the rules announced in Privette, with an emphasis
on legitimacy, were not easily reconciled with earlier cases. Previous
cases held that a husband in a divorce could not be ordered to pay
child support for a child “who is neither his natural nor his adopted
child and for whose care and support he has not contracted.”154 Fol-
lowing the First District in Robinson v. State,155 the court severed le-
gitimacy from paternity.156 Thus, the court held that the Privette best
interests analysis applied only when three conditions existed: (1) a
child faces the threat of being deemed illegitimate; (2) a legal father
faces the risk of losing his parental rights; and (3) “the matter in-
volves contested paternity with the request for blood tests or similar
genetic testing.”157
Because the Daniels’ daughter was born during a lawful marriage,
the Second District held that she was legitimate and that Mr. Daniel
was the legal father for purposes of legitimacy.158 The court empha-
sized that his name would remain on the birth certificate.159 By re-
versing the trial court, the Second District effectively relieved Mr.
Daniel of any obligation to support the child after the judgment of
dissolution.
The Second District’s decision may seem “fair” from Mr. Daniel’s
perspective. From his point of view, he was trying to help out a friend
in trouble. The marriage did not work out, so he should not be stuck
paying child support to someone else’s child for the next seventeen
years. In its simplest terms, the Second District merely held that
Privette did not overrule the earlier cases relieving marital fathers of
their obligation to support quasi-marital children after a divorce. The
                                                                                                                      
151. See id. app. at 9.
152. See id.
153. See Daniel v. Daniel, 681 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
154. Albert v. Albert, 415 So. 2d 818, 820 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); accord Portuondo v. Por-
tuondo, 570 So. 2d 1338, 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Bostwick v. Bostwick, 346 So. 2d 150,
151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Taylor v. Taylor, 279 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
155. 661 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
156. See Daniel, 681 So. 2d at 851 (discussing and agreeing with the Robinson court).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. See id.
159. See id.
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court followed that case law and certified the following question to
the Florida Supreme Court: “Is the presumption of legitimacy over-
come when a married husband and wife stipulated that the child’s fa-
ther is not the husband but do not challenge the child’s legitimacy,
and the birth certificate remains unchanged?”160
The question reveals the difficulties that modern courts are hav-
ing with the common law theories when confronted with genetic evi-
dence. First, a husband and wife in Lord Mansfield’s day would not
have been permitted to enter into this stipulation because they were
not allowed to testify to its content.161 Second, a couple cannot stipu-
late that a child is not the husband’s biological child without chal-
lenging its legitimacy under any traditional definition of “legitimate.”
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the Second Dis-
trict’s conclusion that the Privette best interests standard was lim-
ited “to those instances where a child faces the threat of being de-
clared illegitimate and the ‘legal father’ also faces the threat of losing
parental rights which he seeks to maintain.”162 Thus, Privette was in-
applicable to the issues in Daniel.
In a short opinion with little new analysis, the Florida Supreme
Court answered the Second District’s certified question in the nega-
tive and approved the three conditions that the Second District re-
quired for use of the Privette best interests analysis.163 The supreme
court’s opinion, however, is notable for its discussion of both legiti-
macy and paternity in terms that are hard to reconcile with Privette.
Concerning legitimacy, the court recognized that Mr. Daniel did
not dispute that he was not “asserting any rights he might have had
as [the child’s] ‘legal father’ during the time of the couple’s mar-
riage.”164 In addition, the parties did not dispute the child’s status as
legitimate.165 The court concluded that the child’s legitimacy “will not
be affected by a determination of paternity or any orders of support
that may follow such a determination.”166 It is clear that the supreme
court saw Mr. Daniel as merely a paper legal father, who no longer
had any rights or responsibilities for his legal daughter.167 Gone is
                                                                                                                      
160. Daniel, 681 So. 2d at 852.
161. See Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B. 1777).
162. Daniel, 695 So. 2d at 1253.
163. See id. at 1254.
164. Id. at 1255.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Because Mr. Daniel remains on the birth certificate as the legal father, if Mrs.
Daniel and Mr. Staggers both die in accidents, does Mr. Daniel have any responsibility to
support his legal daughter? Does he have some backup or inchoate obligation even if he
has no support obligation at this time? The court in Daniel did not directly address this
scenario. However, by approving the Albert line of cases, the opinion strongly suggested
that Mr. Daniel would have no obligation to support the child even if she were orphaned by
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the discussion in Privette that the presumption of legitimacy exists to
protect the best interests of the child. Daniel reduces legitimacy to
nothing more than a name on a publicly recorded birth certificate.168
Near the end of its opinion in Daniel, the supreme court stated,
“Just as [the daughter’s] natural lineage was unaffected by her
mother’s marriage, [the daughter’s] legitimacy will not be affected by
a determination of paternity or any orders of support that may follow
such a determination.”169 This assertion may be legally incorrect if
the biological father’s paternity is ever declared in a standard chap-
ter 742 paternity action.170 Moreover, the statement demonstrates
the muddle that has become of the older common law concepts. The
daughter has “natural lineage” to her biological mother; there is ap-
parently no dispute that she does not have “natural lineage” to Mr.
Daniels. If legitimacy has anything to do with the marriage of bio-
logical parents, a determination of paternity will affect her “legiti-
macy.” In fact, the court’s own opinion, identifying this child by
name,171 is a public disclosure that her mother was unmarried at the
time of her conception and that the mother’s husband at the time of
                                                                                                                      
her biological parents. If that is true, legitimacy now has little more practical value than
the buttonhole on a suit’s lapel.
168. The opinion does not discuss fatherhood by estoppel, an issue that the parties did
not address. Nevertheless, Mr. Daniel entered into this marriage with full disclosure. The
law of fatherhood by estoppel is not well developed in Florida, but Mr. Daniel would have
remained the legal father, essentially by estoppel, in some other jurisdictions because he
married a pregnant woman. See Wade v. Wade, 536 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Mar-
shall v. Marshall, 386 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Florida clearly recognizes that
both the husband and the wife can be estopped to deny the husband’s paternity of a child.
However, the case law does not establish what actions for what period of time are neces-
sary to create an estoppel. It is a theory without any established parameters. See, e.g., L...
v. L..., 497 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that a husband must pay child
support in a divorce because he married the wife knowing she was pregnant); Hartford v.
Hartford, 371 N.E.2d 591, 596 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (requiring that a husband pay support
for a Type II quasi-marital child conceived during a temporary separation). In Daniel, a
good argument can be made that Mr. Daniel’s marriage vows created a contract that
should have estopped him from denying parentage in this case. The proposed statute
would leave Mr. Daniel as the legal father unless he had a written agreement with the
mother to determine paternity following the birth of the child. If a similar statute had been
in effect when Mr. Daniel visited his attorney prior to the marriage, it is likely that he
would have had such a prenuptial agreement.
169. See Daniel, 695 So. 2d at 1255.
170. A judgment of paternity invokes the provisions of sections 382.013(2)(c) and
382.015 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2)(c) (Supp. 1998); id. § 382.015
(1997). If a paternity determination showed Mr. Staggers as the biological father, the birth
certificate would normally be amended to show Mr. Staggers as the father on the birth cer-
tificate. Mr. Daniel would no longer be the legal father and his role to protect some concept
of legitimacy would be over. The only reason the birth certificate would not be amended is
because of the supreme court’s specific ruling that the child’s legitimacy “will not be af-
fected by a determination of paternity.” Daniel, 695 So. 2d at 1255. The trial court might
feel compelled to ignore the statute requiring this change and obey the supreme court’s
mandate.
171. See id. at 1254.
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her birth was not her biological father. Under any reasonable defini-
tion, the supreme court itself has declared this child “illegitimate.”
Just as Privette demonstrates the difficulty of relying on the pre-
sumption of legitimacy to resolve quasi-marital children’s issues af-
ter the advent of genetic testing, both Daniel opinions demonstrate a
similar difficulty with the concept of paternity. The Second District
concluded that when all parties to a divorce agree that the husband
is not the “natural father,” then the presumption of legitimacy is not
at issue and that a separate “presumption of paternity” applies.172
The supreme court agreed that “paternity and legitimacy are related,
but nevertheless separate and distinct concepts.”173
The Second District’s “presumption of paternity” has, at best, a
very recent and limited legal history.174 On prior occasions and in
other states, the presumption of paternity seems to have been used
as the equivalent of the presumption of legitimacy175 or as a pre-
sumption used in the context of scientific testing resulting in a high
probability of paternity,176 or in the context of a voluntary acknow-
                                                                                                                      
172. See Daniel v. Daniel, 681 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
173. Daniel, 695 So. 2d at 1254.
174. The “presumption of paternity” concept was borrowed from Prater v. Prater, 491
So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that a Florida court has no jurisdiction to
determine paternity of a child in an ex parte dissolution case where one party lives outside
of Florida and does not appear in the suit). It is not obvious that Judge Dauksch intended
to create a new presumption in that case, and he may have merely used substitute words
to describe the presumption of legitimacy.
The phrase “presumption of paternity” was also used in Hall v. Hall, 672 So. 2d 60, 62
(Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In Hall, a divorce proceeding, an adoptive father of an infant born in
the Philippines claimed that he was also the biological father. See id. at 61 n.1. The First
District Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s use of a “presumption of paternity” by
remanding the case with orders to reinstate temporary, shared custody and visitation
rights to the adoptive mother. See id. at 62. This was somewhat different from the pre-
sumption in Daniel.
175. California’s irrebuttable presumption of paternity is clearly the same as the pre-
sumption of legitimacy. See Hadek, supra note 50, at 374-86 (asserting that California’s
“conclusive presumption of paternity . . . has been a mainstay in California law for well
over a century” resulting from a “deep disdain for illegitimate children and an interest in
preserving the peace and tranquility of the family”). Alabama has a statutory presumption
of paternity that appears comparable to the common law presumption of legitimacy. See
ALA. CODE § 27-17-1 (1975); Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406, 408 (Ala. 1989). The terms
also seem equivalent in Illinois and Oregon. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Klebs, 554 N.E.2d
298, 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Matter of the Marriage of A., 598 P.2d 1258 (Or. Ct. App.
1979). Also, the Uniform Parentage Act contains a presumption of parentage that appears
to be comparable to the common law’s presumption of legitimacy. See UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 9B, U.L.A. 287 (1973); see also POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 398.
176. Section 742.12, Florida Statutes, creates a presumption of paternity when an HLA
test or other scientific test establishes a 95% or greater probability of paternity. See FLA.
STAT. § 742.12(4) (1997). The phrase has been used in earlier cases discussing this statute.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Vidal v. Rivas, 556 So.
2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Jones v. Crawford, 552 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA
1989); Schatz v. Wenaas, 510 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). This presumption is
more typically an evidentiary presumption used in the context of a paternity action nam-
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ledgement of paternity.177 What the Daniel “presumption of pater-
nity” is or how it effects decision making on parentage issues in
Florida remains unclear.
Some states, such as Maine, attempt to restrict the concept of le-
gitimacy so that it has different meanings for the law of inheritance
and the law of paternity.178 This restriction effectively allows for a
presumption of paternity. Whether Florida could make such a dis-
tinction is questionable because the courts have used the presump-
tion of legitimacy too often in the context of child support.179 Never-
theless, Florida needs to decide what “paternity” and “legitimacy”
mean and to clearly use these terms only for their intended purposes.
Furthermore, the author would probably prefer to eliminate all usage
of “legitimacy” in both paternity and probate actions because the
term’s moral and religious overtones interfere with policy-making in
a pluralistic society. Legitimacy tends to stigmatize the child when it
is the parents’ behavior that society wishes to discourage.  If we are
to use judgmental words, they should be directed at the parents—not
the innocent children.
If the primary policy behind paternity is to provide child support
and the primary policy behind the presumption of legitimacy is to
provide stable family units for children, then a presumption of pater-
nity should be used to select the father who pays support when the
presumption of legitimacy fails to establish a family. Because the
child in Daniel had little or no prospect of a family unit that included
either potential father, it is arguable that the duty to support the
                                                                                                                      
ing the putative biological father of a nonmarital child. It may also have use in the quasi-
marital children context, but, clearly, it is not the presumption of paternity discussed in
Daniel.
177. Section 742.10(1), Florida Statutes, allows for a voluntary acknowledgment of pa-
ternity that creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity. See FLA. STAT. § 742.10(1)
(1997); see also Campo v. Tafur, 704 So. 2d 730, 733 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (noting that
an admission of paternity, absent an affidavit, merely creates a rebuttable presumption of
paternity); Womack v. Cook, 634 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (Harris, C.J., dis-
senting) (opining that until the presumption of paternity is rebutted, the paternity action
cannot proceed). Like the presumption for scientific testing, this is an evidentiary pre-
sumption for use in a typical paternity action. It is similar to the concept employed in Dan-
iel because the presumption arises from a voluntary admission and not from any biological
evidence.
178. See, e.g., Denbow v. Harris, 583 A.2d 205, 207 n.1 (Me. 1990) (stating that the
court has “long recognized the distinctions between the meanings of ‘legitimacy’ as used in
the different contexts of inheritance and paternity”).
179. Indeed, Florida’s leading case on the presumption of legitimacy is a divorce case
similar to Daniel involving a Type I quasi-marital child. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 16 So. 2d
163 (Fla. 1944). The marital husband in Eldridge was allowed to challenge the presump-
tion, but failed to overcome the difficult burden of proof, as the wife would not concede the
issue. See id. at 163-64. In this way, the presumption of legitimacy simply turns into the
“presumption of paternity” if the wife concedes that the marital father is not the biological
father. Why a presumption of paternity applies when no one claims that a party is a bio-
logical father is unclear.
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child should fall upon the biological father, at least when the marital
father had such a brief involvement with the child. To that extent,
the ruling in Daniel is defensible.
Because Florida does not limit the concept of legitimacy to inheri-
tance issues, these two presumptions can result in two “legal” fa-
thers. In theory, Mrs. Daniel’s daughter could eventually have a legal
father for legitimacy, Mr. Daniel, and another legal father who paid
support, Mr. Staggers. The sad truth is that she is unlikely to ever
have a “functional father.” Even if Mrs. Daniel pursues a paternity
action against Mr. Staggers and wins, Mr. Staggers is unlikely to
provide any meaningful monetary support. Thus, in reaching their
decisions, both the Second District and the Florida Supreme Court
relied on paternity to locate a support father; however, both courts
failed to locate any true support for this child.180
B.   Daniel’s Other Problems
Two final observations regarding Daniel should be made. First,
the court announced a rule that would probably cause the Privette
procedures to be inapplicable even in the actual Privette case. The
Daniel court stated:
Unlike the circumstances before us here, our decision in Privette
addressed a case of contested paternity involving blood tests, and
its application is limited to those instances where a child faces the
threat of being declared illegitimate, and the “legal father” also
faces the threat of losing parental rights which he seeks to main-
tain.181
In Privette, the legal father did not face the threat of losing the
parental rights he sought to maintain. He was not a party to the ac-
tion and could not lose those rights in abstentia. Even if he had been
notified, he probably would not have wished to maintain these rights.
If the rule announced in Daniel applies to paternity actions where
the husband stipulates that he is not the biological father, it is argu-
able that Privette will rarely apply even in chapter 742 proceedings
filed by married women against putative fathers. Simply put, the
child may have no meaningful constitutional right to maintain le-
gitimacy after Daniel.
                                                                                                                      
180. The impact of Daniel on a child’s right to support and legitimacy is highlighted in
DeRico v. Wilson, 714 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), in which a Type II child, identified
by name, is effectively declared illegitimate in the opinion. Her mother is ordered to repay
child support that was previously provided by the marital father after he petitioned to de-
termine paternity, but while he was still legally married to the mother!
181. Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1997).
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Second, Daniel permits typical parents of marital children to di-
vest their children of support in a dissolution proceeding with no
clear ability on the part of the trial judge to intercede on behalf of the
children. Just because the Daniels were probably telling the truth
does not mean that all married couples will tell the truth.182 If the
putative father is not required to be an actual party to the divorce, a
married couple could stipulate that the husband is not the father of
the marital children and, accordingly, he would be relieved of all
support obligations. Furthermore, there would be no guardian ad li-
tem appointed and no need for judicial review of the accuracy of the
stipulation.183 In many circumstances, adults might defraud the court
to eliminate the husband’s child support obligation, especially given
the high number of cases in which parties are not represented by
counsel in divorce.184 At a minimum, courts confronted with a situa-
tion similar to Daniel, should require the parents and the child(ren)
to undergo genetic testing.185 This would support the stipulation that
the marital father was not the biological father and, thereby, exclude
the possibility of Mr. Daniel’s paternity.
There is a certain upside-down perspective in Daniel and Privette.
In Daniel, a divorce proceeding, the court acts as if the child was a
nonmarital child and implicitly takes a quasi-criminal bastardy or
paternity approach to the problem, examining the case from Mr.
Daniel’s perspective (as a charged defendant). In Privette, a paternity
action, the court uses the presumption of legitimacy to examine the
case from the “best interests” perspective of the child, as if the child
were a marital child seeking support in a divorce proceeding! Neither
perspective is particularly satisfying, and neither comes to terms
with the fact that quasi-marital children are simply a new, third
category of children that can no longer be analyzed using the existing
common law tools.
                                                                                                                      
182. For a post-Daniel example of a case in which the wife did not take a consistent po-
sition on the paternity of her children, see Gantt v. Gantt, 716 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998).
183. Voluntary terminations of parental rights in chapter 39 proceedings require a ju-
dicial determination of the child’s manifest best interests. See FLA. STAT. § 39.4612 (1997).
184. For example, the husband may threaten the wife to evade child support, and she
may prefer to have him out of her life even if that means she will not receive child support.
The wife may wish to be rid of her husband forever, and she may threaten to reveal tax
fraud, for example, unless he relinquishes the child.
185. Genetic testing now includes methods other than HLA testing. See State Dep’t of
Revenue v. Aguirre, 705 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). See generally Brim v. State, 695
So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997) (discussing the admissibility of DNA testing in criminal cases).
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VI.   A STATUTORY PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF QUASI-
MARITAL CHILDREN
If one accepts the proposition that quasi-marital children are a
sizable third category of children whose parentage cannot be ade-
quately resolved under the common law in an era of genetic testing,
then a statutory solution is necessary. This Article’s Appendix pres-
ents a working draft of a proposed revision of chapter 742, Florida
Statutes, designed to address the needs of quasi-marital children and
their marital and biological fathers, as well as their mothers. This
draft is intended as a proposal for discussion and is intentionally not
in final form. Given the differing circumstances of the three types of
children delineated previously, the solutions for parentage issues in-
volving Type I,186 Type II,187 and Type III188 quasi-marital children
require separate statutory provisions.
A.   Assumptions
The statutory proposal rests on many assumptions, which should
be expressly stated. First, the presumption of legitimacy, which at-
tempts to place children in stable permanent family units, should be
promoted in most cases, even at the expense of biological accuracy.
Second, the basic purpose of paternity, which attempts to provide pa-
ternal economic support for all children, should also be achieved
whenever feasible. However, support from the biological father is not
always the most sensible route for quasi-marital children if it con-
flicts with the goal of providing a family unit. Nevertheless, when the
marital father is not likely to function well in either capacity, the
child should have the option of receiving support from the biological
father.
Third, Privette’s reasoning is correct when it prefers a procedure
shifting legal fatherhood from the marital to the biological father.
This approach is preferable to a Daniel style procedure, which elimi-
nates the marital father’s responsibilities without locating another
legal father. Privette’s policy is reasonable, especially concerning
Type II quasi-marital children and all older children.
Fourth, Daniel is correct in arguing that in some cases the marital
father should be relieved of his obligations without shifting those ob-
                                                                                                                      
186. In the proposed statute, these children are referred to as children born within 40
weeks of marriage. See supra Part II.B.1. for a description of Type I quasi-marital children.
187. In the proposed statute, these children are referred to as children born after a
permanent separation. For a description of Type II quasi-marital children, see supra Part
II.B.2.
188. In the proposed statute, these children are referred to as children born after 40
weeks of marriage, but prior to a permanent separation. For a description of Type III
quasi-marital children, see supra Part II.B.3.
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ligations to the biological father. However, these exceptional cases
involve quasi-marital children conceived before marriage or after the
marriage has deteriorated, not children conceived from an adulterous
relationship. Especially in a Type I situation, there is a strong policy
argument that a husband and wife should be able to eliminate the
husband’s status as a legal father without obtaining a divorce. Under
this assumption, family unity may be preserved, but the mother may
be entitled to seek support from the biological father.
Fifth, in Type I and Type III situations, the marital couple should
be encouraged to resolve the issue of paternity through a premarital
agreement or a separation agreement. Sixth, the “best interests”
framework is a reasonable one to determine whether to shift a legal
father’s obligations, but the factors considered in the analysis should
be legislatively described in an effort to obtain more consistent rul-
ings statewide.
Seventh, the statute of limitations in these cases should be rela-
tively short, yet not so short as to force potential litigants to make
rapid and possibly irrational decisions. Any change in legal parents
after the first two years of a child’s life should be treated as parental
terminations or adoptions rather than as initial determinations of
parentage. No special statute of limitations has been created, for the
state in Title IV-D cases. Although an argument can be made for
such a statute, the circumstances of these cases do not warrant any
special rules.
Eighth, biological fathers should have the right to seek legal fa-
ther status in most situations but should be expected to make timely
and serious requests.189 To this end, the proposed statute contains
provisions designed to prevent spiteful claims or frivolous lawsuits.
Existing case law on this point is correct: A stable family unit with a
child conceived from an adulterous affair but born during the mar-
riage should never be forced to accept the claim of a biological fa-
ther.190
Finally, in an era where medical treatment is affected and often
dictated by the patient’s genetic background and many children live
in adequate but nontraditional family structures, the public should
be encouraged not to think in terms of the “stigma of illegitimacy.”
Although children need stable family units, the stigma tends to deny
                                                                                                                      
189. Although the statute gives a right of action to a biological father, it gives no rights
to the child. The Uniform Parentage Act provides for an action by a child. See UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT, § 4, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973). Who would actually bring this action for a
quasi-marital child is still unclear. The author is not convinced that such an action is war-
ranted for quasi-marital children, even if it is warranted for nonmarital children.
190. See G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (holding that a bio-
logical father may not pursue a paternity action for rights to a “Type II quasi-marital
child” when the couple objects).
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children adequate information about their true genetic background.
Thus, although we should be conservative about preserving families
for children, we should be more open about providing them with facts
regarding their biological parents. A child may be entitled to know
who her biological father is, even if he does not receive any of the
rights or responsibilities of legal fatherhood. Likewise, the privacy
rights of putative fathers should be respected, but not at the expense
of children needing genetic information for valid medical reasons.
B.   Basic Framework
The proposal in the Appendix contains only Part III of a revised
chapter 742. Under the proposed statutory scheme, chapter 742
would have four parts: Part I would be a general part; Part II would
consist of paternity and parentage statutes for nonmarital children;
Part III would contain paternity and parentage statutes for quasi-
marital children; and Part IV would deal with surrogacy.
This proposal is strongly influenced by California’s experience un-
der its statutory scheme, which provides for a conclusive presump-
tion of legitimacy.191 Section 7540 of the California Family Code,
which initially referred to the “presumption of legitimacy,” now pro-
vides the following: “Except as provided in [s]ection 7541, the child of
a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.”192
The exceptions in section 7541 allow for determinations based on
scientific testing during the first two years of the child’s life. The pro-
cedures for these exceptions are not explained in detail in the Cali-
fornia statutes, and the proposed Florida statutory revision contains
more specific exceptions and procedures. If the Florida Legislature
were to decline a no-exception presumption of legitimacy, then any
exceptions would need to be described with greater specificity than
those in California’s statutes.193
The biggest advantage of relying upon the California statute is
that its constitutionality was upheld in Michael H. v. Gerald P.194
There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute’s conclusive
presumption of fatherhood was actually a substantive rule of law
                                                                                                                      
191. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1997).
192. Id.
193. See Hadek, supra note 50, at 82-82 (stating that California’s exceptions have effec-
tively “eaten up the rule”); William P. Hoffman, Jr., Recent Developments—California’s
Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV.
754, 761-65 (1968) (discussing the conflicting goals of nuclear family preservation and in-
dividual rights in relation to California’s section 7540).
194. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1984) (repealed
1994)).
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supported by social policy concerns.195 The statute was found consti-
tutional under the rational relation test despite a due process chal-
lenge.196 Likewise, the basic provision in the proposed Florida statute
would be substantive. Except as provided in sections 742.302 through
742.305, a husband shall be the legal father and shall have all of the
rights and responsibilities of a legal (natural) guardian, pursuant to
section 744.301, Florida Statutes, for all children conceived by or
born to his wife during the term of their marriage.197
The vagueness of “cohabiting” in the California statute is elimi-
nated, and the issues of “cohabitation” are addressed in sections
dealing with Type I and Type III quasi-marital children. Impotency
and sterility are not listed as exceptions in the initial section of the
proposal. The retention of these provisions in the California statute
is questionable, especially in an era of surrogacy. Under the Florida
proposal, however, a husband would be able to challenge his status
as legal father for these reasons, subject to the limitations in sections
742.302 to 742.305.
The proposal expressly gives the husband the status of legal
guardian by referring to him as the “legal father.” 198 The author con-
templates that Part I of chapter 742 would contain a definition of “le-
gal father,” which would define the term as the man who is the fa-
ther for purposes of section 744.301, the natural guardian statute,
and who is shown as legal father on the child’s birth certificate.
Thus, in a final version of section 742.301 of the proposal, it would be
sufficient to simply refer to the husband as the legal father.
It is worth emphasizing that “legal father” is not a presumptive
category. Unlike the current common law, this statute establishes a
legal father for virtually every child born to a marriage, either at
birth or shortly thereafter. Thus, the unpredictable doctrine of fa-
therhood by estoppel, which allows a man to become the legal father
based on his actions over time, should have little, if any, application
under this statutory proposal. This is true because the basic provi-
sion in Part I of the proposal will apply to both marital and quasi-
marital children.
C.   A Simpler Statute Based on Other Assumptions
Before discussing the exceptions and limitations created in sec-
tions 742.302 through 742.305 of the proposal, note that the basic
                                                                                                                      
195. See id. at 119-20.
196. See id. at 131.
197. See infra Appendix, § 742.301.
198. See infra Appendix, § 742.301. There are two exceptions to this rule. If a prenup-
tial or separation agreement exists, the husband is not automatically the legal father at
the child’s birth.
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provision, section 742.301, could serve as the entire statute. The
longer proposal is based on the assumption that such a rigid rule,
always making the husband the legal father, would not necessarily
be in the best interests of children and that the exceptions in sections
742.302 through 742.305 will not create undue litigation. In a society
with a high rate of divorce and a significant number of quasi-marital
children, the author accepts Privette’s basic premise—a child’s best
interests may sometimes warrant procedures to identify the best
functional father, or at least a support father, when it is highly un-
likely that the husband will perform these functions.199 Unquestiona-
bly, this assumption adds considerable complexity to the statutory
proposal.
If the Legislature were to conclude that a husband should always
be the legal father of a child born during the marriage and coerce
that man to support all children of the marriage, the statute could be
far simpler. Given that there is merit in simplified laws, this option
should be debated. However, in light of our difficulties in obtaining
compliance with child support orders and the value of a truly func-
tional father, a more complex proposal is presented.
As a middle ground, the Legislature could choose to provide no
right for either the husband or wife to shift legal fatherhood for Type
I and II children. This would eliminate the provisions in sections
742.302 and 742.304 of the draft but retain the right for permanently
separated couples to identify the biological father. Also, the right of
the biological father to become the legal father could be retained un-
der section 742.305.200
D.   Addressing Quasi-Marital Children
1.   Type I Quasi-Marital Children
The issues raised by Type I children201 are resolved under section
742.302 of the proposal.202 The proposed statute defines these chil-
dren as born within forty weeks of marriage.203 This period, of course,
is based on the standard term of human gestation. A different time
span could be specified in the statute, but gestation seems to be the
easiest period to use. The time span could be further limited. For ex-
ample, one might wish to exempt premature children whose esti-
mated date of conception was subsequent to the date of the marriage;
                                                                                                                      
199. See Brashier, supra note 12, at 134-36 (concluding that an irrebuttable presump-
tion that the husband is the legal father is not always in the child’s best interest).
200. See infra Appendix, § 742.305.
201. Type I children are conceived prior to marriage but born after marriage.
202. See infra Appendix, § 742.302.
203. See infra Appendix, § 742.302.
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however, the confusion created and the resulting costs would out-
weigh the further benefit of this complexity.
Two statutory approaches are provided for Type I children: pri-
vate agreement and litigation. If the marital couple is aware of the
pregnancy prior to the marriage or if they simply wish to protect
against this contingency, they may enter into a prenuptial agreement
allowing for a future determination of paternity for any child born
during the first forty weeks of the marriage.204 The agreement would
allow the parties to obtain scientific testing without any court order.
Within ninety days of the child’s birth, the couple would either need
to file a stipulation of paternity or an action to determine pater-
nity.205 “Paternity” is used in the proposal to describe the procedures
normally used for nonmarital children under Part II of chapter 742.
If no action is taken, the husband automatically becomes the legal fa-
ther on the ninety-first day.206 Thus, even if he is not the biological
father, he can become the legal father simply by taking no action.
Under this default rule, only the mother is a legal guardian of the
child during the first ninety days.207
If testing determines that the husband is not the biological father,
the paternity action will declare that he is not the legal father.208 As
long as the couple lives together, the husband will have an obligation
to support the child under Daniel and Albert v. Albert;209 however, the
mother will have the right to file a paternity action against another
man to obtain support. Thus, this statute allows the couple to remain
married and provide a family unit for the child, while also allowing
pursuit of a child support claim against another man. In essence, the
husband becomes the stepfather and the mother seeks support from
the biological father as she would from a prior husband. Whether the
biological father would be entitled to visitation or other rights would
be matters resolved in the paternity action under the provisions of
Part II of chapter 742, which would consider both paternity and par-
entage issues that arise by virtue of a declaration of paternity.210
                                                                                                                      
204. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(1).
205. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(1)(b).
206. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(1)(b).
207. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(1)(c).
208. The couple, however, may choose not to file the paternity action after receiving
the genetic testing. The couple may, however, allow the marital father to become the legal
father by stipulation or by taking no action.
209. 415 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (holding that a husband could be ordered to
support a child regardless of whether the child is his natural child, adopted child, or
whether the husband contracted to support the child).
210. This assumes that, unlike the existing statutes, Part II would have specific provi-
sions dealing with support and visitation similar to the provisions in chapter 61, Florida
Statutes.
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If the couple does not enter into an agreement, the husband be-
comes the child’s legal father at birth.211 Either the husband or the
wife may file an action to eliminate the husband’s status as legal fa-
ther within one year or to shift that status to another man within
two years.212
The action to eliminate the husband’s status as legal father re-
quires proof that he is not the biological father and that he was ei-
ther unaware of his wife’s pregnancy at the time of their marriage or
that he thought he was the child’s biological father. Thus, under the
proposed statute, Mr. Daniel would not have been allowed to file
such an action because he knew about the pregnancy. Because Mr.
Daniel consulted an attorney, he would have likely resolved this
situation through a written agreement. The knowledge limitation on
an action to eliminate the status of legal father essentially expands
the existing theory of fatherhood by estoppel. If the groom knows
about the pregnancy at the time of the marriage and does not ar-
range for a private written agreement, he is estopped from denying
that he is the child’s legal father.213 He will have the option to shift
legal father status to the biological father, but not to leave the child
unsupported.
The statutory proposal retains the Privette requirement that ac-
tions under Part III (the proposed statute) be filed under oath. Re-
quiring fact-specific, sworn pleadings should ensure that suits are
filed in good faith. While the statute does not retain the concept of
“good faith” discussed in Privette,214 the time limitations and other
restrictions of this statute are assumed to be sufficient to protect
against bad faith filings.
The proposal requires a “greater weight of the evidence” burden of
proof in litigation involving children born in the first few months of
the marriage because a clear and convincing standard, as required by
Privette, is not probably constitutionally essential in Type I cases.215
Given that scientific testing can now exclude the possibility of bio-
logical fatherhood at very high probability levels, it may be simpler
to rely upon a clear and convincing standard for all final hearings.
                                                                                                                      
211. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(1)(b).
212. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(a). The action to shift status is identical to an ac-
tion for Type II children and will not be discussed further in the context of a Type I child.
213. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(b).
214. Department of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1993).
215. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(b)(2). The clear and convincing standard in
Privette is primarily a modernized expression of the strength of the presumption of legiti-
macy. When a full-term child is born within 40 weeks of the marriage, it is obvious that the
child was not conceived within the marriage. No obvious reason exists as to why constitu-
tional due process should compel a high burden of proof when selecting a legal father un-
der these circumstances. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Keep in mind, however, that genetic testing results will not always
be available from all relevant adults at the final hearing. The greater
weight burden is preferable because it is the standard burden of
proof in a typical paternity action. Justifying a higher burden of proof
for Type I and Type III children, under this proposal, is difficult. If
the right to retain one’s legitimacy in Privette has any meaning after
Daniel, the child’s claim to parentage rights and the responsibilities
that flow from a marital father and a family should be preserved and
protected.
If the court determines that the husband may be relieved of his
status as legal father, that change is effective on the date of the
judgment.216 The mother, therefore, becomes the sole guardian.217 In
the case of a written agreement, the wife is then free to pursue a pa-
ternity action against another man. Indeed, the proposal encourages
the initial lawsuit to name the putative father as a party so that the
child can have support from the biological father as soon as possible.
Again, this should encourage the husband and wife to provide a fam-
ily unit for the child, while increasing the chances that the biological
father will at least provide economic, if not emotional, support.
If the husband objects to the elimination of his legal father status
in an action filed by the wife, the statutory proposal allows him to
remain the legal father unless his rights are terminated in a chapter
39 proceeding218 or unless a transfer of rights to the biological father
is an option that is in the best interests of the child.219 This provision
essentially recognizes that fatherhood by estoppel may affect the
mother as well as the father. Without a prior written agreement,
however, she should not be allowed to terminate the husband’s
status, as compared to shifting the status to the biological father.220
In such circumstances, the statute should expressly provide for a
guardian ad litem.
                                                                                                                      
216. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(c)(1).
217. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(c)(1). Note that no guardian ad litem is required
in this action. If the husband is entitled to be relieved of the status of legal father without
shifting that status to another man based upon specific factual findings, there is little or no
function for a guardian ad litem in such an action.
218. See FLA. STAT. § 39.4611 (1997).
219. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(c)(2). This refinement addresses another concern
raised by Professor Burke. Given that either the husband or wife can seek fatherhood by
estoppel, this provision would estop the wife from eliminating a viable functional father
when no other man is available to fill that slot. It seems unlikely that a mother would
make this request in many cases, but it could occur in the context of a divorce.
220. The proposal may contain an estoppel that is too rigid. Since the mother may not
have known that she needed a prenuptial agreement if she was only a few days pregnant,
it is possible that “unfit” is too strong and that “best interests” should be the test for both
transfer and elimination of paternal rights in these cases.
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Two procedural provisions warrant comment. First, the statute
prohibits reference to scientific testing in all initial complaints filed
to resolve disputes involving quasi-marital children.221 This prohibi-
tion is included because, in some cases, the mother and the biological
father secretly obtain genetic testing without the consent of a hus-
band who wanted to remain the legal father. Although this restric-
tion may be more important in cases involving Type II children, it is
placed in all provisions permitting lawsuits.222
Second, the proposal permits constructive service of the husband
or wife.223 Chapter 48, Florida Statutes, would need to be modified to
allow for the service described in this proposal. Constructive service
allows a court to adjudge a child’s best interest, even if a parent is
unavailable for service.224 The proposal, however, intentionally
makes no provision for constructive service on a putative father.225 As
a practical matter, the parent with custody of the child will almost
always need to be served and participate in this action.226 If parties
are constructively served, genetic testing will be difficult or impossi-
ble. Thus, although lack of personal service will not bar the action, it
will present significant problems in meeting burdens of proof.
2.   Type III Quasi-Marital Children
The issues raised by Type III children227 are resolved under sec-
tion 742.303 of the proposal.228 Like the provisions for Type I chil-
dren, these cases can be controlled by a private separation agreement
or resolved in litigation.229 The husband can eliminate his status as
                                                                                                                      
221. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(b)(1). This provision addresses procedural issues
and, therefore, would probably require adoption by the supreme court as a rule of proce-
dure. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
222. As an alternative, it might be sensible for the Florida Legislature to prohibit ge-
netic testing of a child without the consent of both legal parents, if both exist, in the ab-
sence of a court order. This would not regulate out-of-state testing. Recently, in Lefler v.
Lefler, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D114, D115 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 30, 1998), a father, suspicious of
the paternity of his ex-wife’s child, had blood tests performed during visitation with the
child. The testing was conducted without the knowledge or consent of the child’s mother.
See id.
223. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(e).
224. See Rich v. Rich, 214 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (holding that construc-
tive service on a nonresident parent is adequate for purposes of due process with regards to
trying custody issues).
225. See id. at 779 (noting that child custody is in rem and must be filed where the
children are located); Drucker v. Fernandez, 288 So. 2d 283, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (indi-
cating that no constructive service is authorized in paternity—apparently due to statutory
omission).
226. See infra Appendix, § 742.302(2)(e).
227. Type III children are conceived and born after a married couple has permanently
separated.
228. See infra Appendix, § 742.303.
229. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(1).
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legal father in some instances, or he can shift the status to the bio-
logical father under provisions comparable to those for a Type II
child.
Type III children are defined in the proposed statute as children
born after a permanent separation.230 For purposes of the separation
agreement, the proposal includes children born six months (180 days)
after the execution of that agreement.231 Arguably, the statute could
also include children born at any time after the execution of the
agreement, but concern may arise as to whether agreements signed
shortly before the child’s delivery are made under duress. By treating
late term pregnancies as Type II children, some risks of abuse are
therefore eliminated.
Separation agreements are already contemplated in the statutes
regulating divorce.232 The proposed separation agreement would al-
low testing to determine the paternity of any child born to a perma-
nently separated couple.233 Such an agreement might help avoid di-
vorce between a couple that was experiencing difficulties but was not
certain their differences were irreconcilable.
The effect of a separation agreement is not identical to that of the
prenuptial agreement. As in the case of a prenuptial agreement, the
husband is not the legal father at the time of the child’s birth unless
he is subsequently determined as such.234 The husband cannot auto-
matically become the legal father after six months because he may
not even be aware of the child’s existence during the first six months
of its life. Instead, the statute creates a modest civil penalty for fail-
ing to comply with the agreement and indicates that such failure is
evidence of “neglect,” which could allow for a dependency proceed-
ing.235 Hopefully, these provisions would give the mother an adequate
incentive to take the steps necessary to resolve this paternity issue
shortly after the child’s birth.
It should be noted that the failure of the mother to act in this pe-
riod effectively transforms the child into a nonmarital child. She still
may file a paternity action against her husband or any other putative
father, but presumably, after the six-month period, the birth certifi-
cate would issue without naming any father.
As an alternative, the statute could provide that the husband be
the legal father for any child born during the first forty weeks of the
                                                                                                                      
230. See infra Appendix, § 742.303.
231. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(1).
232. See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (1997) (providing that “[t]he cut-off date for determin-
ing assets and liabilities to be identified or classified as marital assets and liabilities is the
earliest of the date the parties enter into a valid separation agreement”).
233. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(1)(a).
234. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(1)(c).
235. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(1)(b).
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agreement, but not for children born thereafter. This would more
closely align with the treatment of Type I children. One way or an-
other, this statute would effectively resolve the legal father issue for
many of these children in the first six months of their lives.
If no separation agreement exists, the husband or wife may file an
action to terminate the husband’s status as legal father.236 Like a
Type I action, an action to eliminate the status of legal father must
be filed within one year of the child’s birth, but an action to transfer
the status to the biological father can be filed within two years.237
In such an action, the definition of “permanent separation” re-
quires proof that the parties neither resided together nor engaged in
intercourse for the thirty-day period prior to conception.238 This pe-
riod is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. It will be established by the
testimony of the parties, which may not always be accurate. If the
statute required a longer period of separation, fewer children would
lose marital fathers as legal fathers and more children would be in-
volved in Privette style cases to shift legal fathers. Thirty days has
been proposed in this statute because it seems to be the shortest
workable period.
The sworn allegations of the lawsuit and the procedures in the
Type III lawsuit are similar to those for Type I children. There is no
“knowledge of pregnancy” issue in a Type III case because concepts of
fatherhood by estoppel seem inapplicable in a Type III case. Instead,
the parties must prove separation to remove themselves from the
Type II scenario.239
If the court determines that the husband may be relieved of his
legal father status, the date of the judgment ends the husband’s pe-
riod as legal father and the mother becomes the sole guardian.240 The
mother is then free to file a paternity action against any other man.
As with Type I proceedings, a guardian ad litem would serve no use-
ful function in this lawsuit.
This action also allows for constructive service of process.241
Privette demonstrates that constructive service on the husband in
Type III cases may be necessary because his whereabouts may be
completely unknown after a few years of separation.242 Again, con-
structive service may lead to incomplete genetic testing.
                                                                                                                      
236. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(2).
237. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(2)(a).
238. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(2)(b).
239. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(2)(b).
240. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(2)(c).
241. See infra Appendix, § 742.303(2)(e).
242. See Department of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 308 n.4 (Fla. 1993).
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3.   Type II Quasi-Marital Children
Issues involving Type II children,243 the children born into an es-
tablished, functioning marriage, are resolved under section 742.304
of the proposed statute.244 Unlike the provisions for Type I and Type
III children, section 742.304 makes no provision for private agree-
ments and provides no option to eliminate a legal father for these
children.245 For these children, the statute honors the old presump-
tion of legitimacy to the extent that the marital father will be the le-
gal father unless it is in a child’s best interests to shift that status to
the biological father. No valid policy reason exists to create circum-
stances allowing married couples to eliminate a legal father for such
a child through litigation even if the couple is in the midst of a di-
vorce.246 Such an option would encourage divorce and breakup of
family units with little to be gained in the process.247
Section 742.304 largely codifies the procedures suggested in
Privette248 by allowing an action to be filed to shift the status of legal
father from the marital father to the biological father. Normally, an
action must be filed by the husband or wife within two years of the
child’s birth.249 If the putative biological father is a willing partici-
pant, the action may be filed within five years.250
A guardian ad litem would serve a useful purpose in these pro-
ceedings. The statute does not automatically mandate a guardian,
but requires the court to explain the reasons for dispensing with the
services of a guardian.251 To control the activities of the guardian, the
                                                                                                                      
243. Type II children are conceived when the mother is lawfully married and living
with the husband.
244. See infra Appendix, § 742.304.
245. See infra Appendix, § 742.304.
246. This proposal assumes that these statutory provisions would be the only method
to resolve paternity and parentage. Such an action might be consolidated with a divorce,
but these issues would not be resolved within a dissolution proceeding. If probate statutes
allowed for inheritance only from a legal father, there would be little, if any, need to re-
solve paternity issues in probate proceedings.
247. Admittedly, one can imagine cases that encourage such an elimination of status
for the legal father of a Type II quasi-marital child. For example, if the wife delivered a
child with severe birth defects and the child was obviously not the marital father’s, the re-
sulting medical bills could bankrupt the marital father. Some might argue that the marital
father should be able to free himself of such a child, but such hard cases will likely be rare.
Any exception would be hard to tailor so that it only applied in such extreme cases.
248. See Department of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1993) (requiring a
showing of good faith and that the child’s best interest will not be adversely affected before
allowing someone to challenge the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock).
249. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(1).
250. Actions after five years would be possible if the mother married the biological fa-
ther. Then, even if the child were a teenager, the marital father could permit a voluntary
termination of his parental rights, and the biological father could adopt the child in a step-
parent adoption. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (1997).
251. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(2)(b).
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statute also states that the order appointing the guardian shall spec-
ify the scope and method of the guardian’s investigation.252 Thus, the
guardian may be limited to standard discovery procedures or in-
structed to perform or not to perform certain interviews. This will
protect privacy and also help to make the process more cost effective.
The statutory criteria for shifting fathers varies from Privette in
two respects. First, rather than following Privette by alleging that a
blood test is warranted because it would serve the child’s best inter-
ests, even if it proved “illegitimacy,”253 the statute requires a deter-
mination that the child’s best interests would be served by a transfer
of the status of legal father from the marital father to the biological
father.254 This change is largely, if not entirely, semantic and avoids
the “stigma” approach encouraged by Privette.255
Second, the statute contains six factors and a seventh catch-all
factor, which the trial court must consider in making a decision re-
garding a child’s best interest.256 These factors are borrowed, to a
large extent, from the statutes regulating custody decisions in di-
vorce.257 Section 742.304(3)(a) emphasizes the family unit, a method
incorporating the basic policy underlying the presumption of legiti-
macy. Section 742.304(3)(b) emphasizes support to incorporate the
policies underlying the law of paternity.
The proposed statute expressly allows the court to emphasize eco-
nomic support issues if neither father is likely to provide emotional
support as a functional father within the family unit. This provision
essentially overrules the line of cases that resulted in the Daniel de-
cision.258 If a couple with a quasi-marital child more than one year
old is divorced or divorcing, this statute does not allow the marital
father to evade a support obligation. This will discourage divorce as a
means to avoid support for quasi-marital children.259
As mentioned earlier, the proposed statute uses a lower burden of
proof for the paternity issue than for the transfer of parentage issue.
As written, this proposal is still cumbersome, largely because it at-
tempts to parallel the procedure announced in Privette. With all due
respect to the supreme court, it is doubtful whether the clear and
convincing standard of proof is constitutionally necessary or even
                                                                                                                      
252. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(2)(b).
253. See Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308.
254. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(2)(c).
255. See Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308.
256. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(3)(a)(1)-(7).
257. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1997).
258. See Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1997).
259. Logically, the marital father who is left supporting the child after a divorce might
have some right of contribution from the biological father. Such a right, however, would be
difficult to implement in the real world.
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warranted in the discovery phase.260 This discovery should be permit-
ted based on a lesser burden of proof and persuasion, especially given
the need for accurate genetic information for medical purposes. Thus,
a statute in which the decision to obtain scientific testing was made
by the greater weight of the evidence is preferable. The proposal
places the two questionable uses of the clear and convincing standard
in bracketed italics.261 Maintaining the clear and convincing standard
for the final shift of legal fatherhood is probably warranted and eas-
ily implemented.
This statute further permits the court to grant the marital father
visitation if the status of legal father is shifted to the biological fa-
ther or to grant similar visitation to the biological father if no shift
occurs.262 Visitation only occurs if it is in the child’s best interests.263
These provisions may be invoked rarely, but children have received
similar visitation rights in other states.264 Temporary visitation as a
method to slowly transfer the child from one man to the other may
occasionally be useful, especially when custody of a child is shifted
from a marital father to a biological father. The Florida Legislature
may wish to emphasize that such visitation is more the exception
than the rule.
Finally, if the marital father retains legal father status at the end
of the lawsuit, the statute gives the trial court discretion to retain ju-
risdiction to shift legal father status to the putative, biological father
should the marital father die or become totally disabled.265 Therefore,
the child would have a “backup” father, as a variety of paternal life
and disability insurance. It makes little sense for a child to be at risk
or for taxpayers to support a child when a biological father is avail-
able to provide some support. This provision may be rarely used, but
it would occasionally have value.
                                                                                                                      
260. See supra note 71.
261. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(2)(c).
262. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(4)(a).
263. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(4)(b).
264. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dureno, 854 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (visi-
tation of a marital father of “Type II quasi-marital child”); Francis v. Francis, 654 N.E.2d
4, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (visitation to a marital father of “Type II quasi-marital children”);
Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287, 296-97 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (possible visitation for a
biological father of a “Type I quasi-marital child” despite a stable marriage); Seger v.
Seger, 547 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (visitation of a marital father of a “Type I
quasi-marital child”).
265. See infra Appendix, § 742.304(5)(c).
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E.   Biological Fathers
Putative biological fathers have no right of action under sections
742.302 to 742.304 of this proposal.266 Their rights are separately
provided in section 742.305 because their actions create additional
issues.267 Although most of the provisions are similar to a section
742.304 action, including the best interest analysis, there are several
significant differences.
First, to avoid frivolous or spiteful suits, the putative father must
obligate himself to child support prior to litigating the paternity and
parentage issues.268 Any man who really wants to be the legal father
of a child ought to be willing to pay support for the child from the ini-
tiation of his lawsuit. The author suspects that this provision would
cause these lawsuits to be relatively rare.
The statute of limitations uses a one-year period, rather than a
two-year period, as the basic provision. It also establishes a two-year
period of repose in the event that the petitioner did not or could not
have known of the child’s birth within the first year.269 If the biologi-
cal father discovers his claim between the first and second year, he
must bring the action within ninety days of discovery. Arguably, it
would be simpler to use a two-year limitations period. Given the ra-
pidity with which infants bond with parents in a family setting, an
action by an outsider should be filed in a manner that would allow
the issues to be resolved, rather than initiated, within two years.
Second, a couple in a stable marriage can block such a lawsuit
when it is filed concerning a Type II quasi-marital child.270 This is
consistent with existing law.271 This provision does not apply to Type
I or III children. In a Type III situation, a separation exists and the
couple cannot claim to have a stable family unit. If they have recon-
                                                                                                                      
266. The only exception to this statement is the right of the biological father, in con-
junction with the husband and wife, to file a section 742.304 action involving “Type II
quasi-marital children,” after the statute of limitations would normally expire. See infra
Appendix, § 742.304 (1).
267. See infra Appendix, § 742.305.
268. See infra Appendix, § 742.305(2).
269. See infra Appendix, § 742.305(1).
270. See infra Appendix, § 742.305(4).
271. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (finding, at the time of deci-
sion, no state cases awarding substantive parental rights to a biological father of a child
born into wedlock); G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (reading
Privette to hold that the goal of paternity determination is to protect a child’s legitimacy
and the legal father’s relationship with his child); K.S. v. R.S., 657 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995), vacated, 669 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1996) (asserting that no cause of action ex-
ists to determine paternity by a putative father when the mother conceived the child while
married); Girard v. Wagenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372, 380-81 (Mich. 1991) (holding that a pu-
tative father does not have standing to bring an action to determine the paternity of a child
in wedlock).
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ciled, the statute still allows the marital father to remain the legal
father;272 that outcome is simply not compulsory.
In a Type I situation, the biological father may have attempted
unsuccessfully to marry the mother. The marriage to the marital fa-
ther may have occurred to block his claim. This proposal does not al-
low a marriage to block the putative biological father’s claim to a
Type I child if he can prove that he offered to marry the mother or
that she knowingly concealed the pregnancy from him. Again, the
biological father may not prevail on the best interests test, but the
scientific testing will take place. If the marital father prevails in such
a lawsuit, this Type I scenario could be one in which visitation rights
for a biological father might occasionally make sense.273
Finally, there is a risk that the husband and wife will not object to
the biological father’s claim when an objection would be in the child’s
best interests. This proposal requires service on the custodial parent
and it gives the trial court discretion to treat the petition as con-
tested even when it is not.274 A default judgment will not be possible
under this proposal.
The proposed statute is complex, but no more complex than dis-
solution statutes. The complexity is necessary because there are no
simple solutions to these parental rights issues. The proposal is rea-
sonably designed to give the maximum number of quasi-marital chil-
dren an adequate home and a meaningful right to support. Thus,
only in rare cases, when it is probably more sensible to treat the child
as a nonmarital child, the proposal will relieve the marital father of
his obligations as legal father without locating the biological father
as a substitute. Instead, the proposal provides a workable forum for
Privette-style transfers and gives a forum to a biological father, if he
is willing to establish that his claim is factually accurate and his in-
terests are sufficiently sincere to be backed by a voluntary support
obligation at the inception of the lawsuit. This structure maintains
the longstanding policies behind the presumption of legitimacy and
paternity, while offering a new approach compatible with genetic
testing.
VII.   CONCLUSION
The children of our marriages are no longer adequately served by
a legal system that gives them only presumptive fathers. These chil-
dren need legal fathers with clearly designated rights and responsi-
                                                                                                                      
272. See infra Appendix, § 742.305(4)(b).
273. See infra Appendix, § 742.305(7)(b).
274. See infra Appendix, § 742.305(3).
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bilities. These legal fathers should be established at birth or as soon
thereafter as is feasible.
We should recognize that the presumption of legitimacy primarily
protected a child’s need for a family unit. That need has little to do
with biology. The judges who created this presumption never ex-
pected that medical science would undermine this presumption to
protect families. Now that the presumption can be readily overcome,
we must reestablish laws that give children families.
The common law has failed us in our effort to protect the children
of families—especially quasi-marital children. Courts are now issu-
ing result-oriented decisions that cannot be easily reconciled because
the common law gives judges no fair alternatives. We need to reas-
sess our social policies concerning children and families, using neu-
tral terminology, to establish contemporary laws that maximize the
number of children with functional family units and also maximize
the number of children receiving financial support from some “fa-
ther” when no family unit exists. A child losing his or her only legal
father in a court proceeding should be the rare exception. A court
should occasionally be allowed to shift the mantle of legal father from
one man to another, but only with reliance on clear standards pro-
moting the best interests of the child. This task is too complex for
evolution by the case method of the common law and must be per-
formed by the legislature.
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APPENDIX
This proposal assumes that chapter 742 would be divided into
three or four parts. Part I would contain definitions, general policy
statements, and statutory provisions common to all parts, such as
venue and the admissibility of scientific or genetic testing. Part II
would be entitled “Determination of Parentage for Children Born Out
of Wedlock” or “Determination of Parentage for Nonmarital Chil-
dren.” It would contain provisions comparable to the current law of
paternity for nonmarital children, but it would clearly provide for a
paternity determination as a matter of biology. This would be fol-
lowed by a determination of child support obligations and visitation
rights as a matter of parentage. Although the proposal refers to chil-
dren born in wedlock, Part III would resolve issues involving quasi-
marital children. Significantly, this part also establishes a statutory
“legal father” for all marital children. If a Part IV were to be imple-
mented, it should contain the current statutes on surrogacy.
This proposal makes a few assumptions. It assumes that the leg-
islature would establish a few guardians ad litem as salaried em-
ployees in each circuit, and that chapter 49, concerning constructive
service of process, would be amended as necessary.275 Finally, the
provisions governing birth certificates in chapter 382 would probably
need to be slightly modified to accommodate this proposal.
CHAPTER 742: PROPOSED PART III
DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE FOR CHILDREN BORN IN
WEDLOCK
742.301 Husband as legal father.—Except as provided in ss.
742.302-.305, a husband shall be the legal father, and he shall have
all of the rights and responsibilities of a legal (natural) guardian
pursuant to s. 744.301, for all children conceived by or born to his
wife during the term of their marriage.
742.302 Children born within 40 weeks from the date of
marriage.—A husband’s rights and responsibilities as legal father
for a child born within 40 weeks from the date of the marriage may
be eliminated without the establishment of another legal father un-
der the following circumstances:
(1) Prior to marriage, the couple may enter into a written agree-
ment providing that the husband will not be the legal father of any
child born during the first forty weeks of the marriage unless he is
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later determined to be the biological father under the procedures
used to determine paternity of a nonmarital child.
(a) By signing such an agreement, the parties agree to permit
scientific testing to be performed to determine paternity without the
need of a petition pursuant to this chapter.
(b) Within 90 days of the child’s date of birth, the husband and
wife shall either file a stipulation of paternity pursuant to s.
742.10(1), or the husband shall file an action to determine paternity
under the provisions of Part II of this section. Failure to file either
the stipulation or the paternity action within ninety days shall act as
a determination that the husband is the child’s legal father.
(c) Unless and until the husband is determined to be the legal fa-
ther, the mother will be the sole legal (natural) guardian pursuant to
s. 744.301.
(2) Under the provisions of this subsection, if no written agree-
ment is signed prior to the marriage, the husband or wife may file a
petition to determine paternity and establish parentage of any child
born during the first forty weeks of the marriage.
(a) The petition must be filed within one year of the child’s birth.
Both the husband and wife must be parties to the action, and the pe-
tition may include a putative biological father as a party. An action
which is untimely under this section, but would be timely under s.
742.304, may be litigated pursuant to that section.
(b) The petition must allege under oath a reasonable factual ba-
sis to support the petitioner’s claim that the husband is not the bio-
logical father of the child and that he either was unaware of his
wife’s pregnancy on the date of the marriage, or that he reasonably
believed he was the biological father at the time of marriage.
1. The petition shall not allege that scientific testing has been
performed or allege the results of such testing unless the tests were
performed with the knowledge and consent of both the husband and
wife.
2. If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence
that the sworn allegations, if true, would be sufficient to relieve the
husband of his rights and responsibilities as legal father, it shall or-
der scientific testing and determine whether the husband is the bio-
logical father. If the putative biological father is a party to the action,
the court may order scientific testing of this party at the same time
as the husband, wife, and child. The testing of the putative biological
father may be delayed if one of the parties requests that his testing
be delayed.
(c) If the court determines that the husband is not the biological
father and that he either was unaware of his wife’s pregnancy on the
date of the marriage or that he reasonably believed he was the bio-
logical father at the time of marriage, the court:
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1. Shall enter an order, on the husband’s motion, relieving the
husband of his rights and responsibilities as legal father. As a result
of this order, the mother will be the sole legal (natural) guardian
pursuant to section 744.301. If the putative biological father is a
party to the action, the court may then proceed to determine pater-
nity under the procedures of Part II of this chapter; or,
2. Shall enter an order, on the wife’s motion, unless the husband
objects, relieving the husband of his rights and responsibilities as le-
gal father. If the husband objects, the court may not relieve the hus-
band of his status as legal father unless his rights could be termi-
nated under the grounds specified in s. 39.464, but the court may
transfer that status to the biological father under the procedures of s.
742.304.
(d) If the court determines that the husband is not the biological
father and that he was either aware of his wife’s pregnancy on the
date of the marriage or that he had no reasonable belief that he was
the biological father at the time of the marriage, the court shall not
relieve the husband of his status as legal father. However, the court
may transfer the status of legal father to the biological father under
the procedures of s. 742.304.
(e) Either the husband or wife may be served by constructive
service of process for an action under this section, but personal juris-
diction over the custodial parent must be obtained by service under s.
48.031.
742.303 Children born after a permanent separation.—A
husband’s rights and responsibilities as legal father for a child con-
ceived or born after a permanent separation, but prior to a judgment
dissolving the marriage, may be eliminated without the establish-
ment of another legal father under the following circumstances:
(1) If the husband and wife enter into a valid separation agree-
ment, it may provide that the husband will not be the legal father of
any child born more than 180 days after the date of the separation
agreement unless he is later determined to be the biological father
under the procedures used to determine paternity of a nonmarital
child.
(a) By signing such an agreement, the parties agree to permit
scientific testing to determine paternity without the need of a peti-
tion pursuant to this chapter.  They further agree to provide each
other with an adequate mailing address at all times during the term
of the agreement.
(b) Within six months of the child’s date of birth, the husband
and wife shall either file a stipulation of paternity pursuant to s.
742.10(1), or either party shall file an action to determine paternity
under the provisions of Part II. Failure to file either the stipulation
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or the paternity action within six months shall be evidence of neglect,
as defined in s. 39.01(36). Failure to act under this section, shall not
prejudice any party’s right to file a subsequent action to determine
paternity pursuant to s. 742.302, but willful failure to comply with s.
742.303(1)(a) shall subject a party to a civil penalty not exceeding
$1000 in any subsequent paternity proceeding.
(c) By virtue of such an agreement, unless and until the husband
is determined to be the legal father, the mother is the sole legal
(natural) guardian pursuant to s. 744.301.
(2) If no valid separation agreement is signed, the husband or
wife may file a petition to determine paternity and establish parent-
age of any child born more than forty weeks after a permanent sepa-
ration.
(a) The petition must be filed within 1 year of the child’s birth.
Both the husband and wife must be parties to the action, and the pe-
tition may include a putative biological father as a party. An action
which is untimely under this section, but would be timely under s.
742.304, may be litigated pursuant to that section.
(b) The petition must be under oath and must allege a reasonable
factual basis to support the petitioner’s claim that the husband is not
the biological father and that the parties had permanently separated
prior to the child’s conception.  Permanent separation shall require
proof that the parties had not resided together and had not engaged
in sexual intercourse within 30 days of the estimated date of the
child’s conception.
1. The petition shall not allege that scientific testing has been
performed or allege the results of such testing unless the tests were
performed with the knowledge and consent of both the husband and
wife.
2. If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence
that the sworn allegations, if true, would be sufficient to relieve the
husband of his rights and responsibilities as legal father, it shall or-
der scientific testing and determine whether the husband is the bio-
logical father. If the putative biological father is a party to the action,
the court may order scientific testing of this party at the same time
as the husband, wife, and child. The testing of the putative biological
father may be delayed if one of the parties requests that his testing
be delayed.
(c) If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence
that the husband is not the biological father and that the couple had
permanently separated, the court shall enter an order relieving the
husband of his rights and responsibilities as legal father, and the
mother is thereafter the sole legal (natural) guardian pursuant to
section 744.301. If the putative biological father is a party to the ac-
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tion, the court may proceed to determine paternity under the proce-
dures of Part II.
(d) If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence
that the husband is not the biological father and that the couple was
not permanently separated at the time of conception, the court shall
not relieve the husband of his status as legal father but may transfer
that status to the biological father under the procedures of s.
742.304.
(e) The husband or wife may be served by constructive service of
process for an action under this section, but personal jurisdiction
over the custodial parent must be obtained by service under s.
48.031.
742.304 Children born more than 40 weeks from the date of
marriage but prior to a permanent separation.—A husband’s
rights and responsibilities as legal father for a child born more than
40 weeks from the date of the marriage and prior to a permanent
separation may not be eliminated except in a circuit court action
which declares the biological father to be the child’s legal father. The
husband or wife may file a petition to determine paternity and es-
tablish parentage of any such child only if the petition requests that
a putative biological father be declared the child’s legal father.
(1) The petition must be filed within two years of the child’s birth
unless the husband, wife, and putative biological father all sign the
petition, in which case it may be filed within five years of the child’s
birth.
(2) The petition must allege under oath a reasonable factual ba-
sis to support the petitioner’s claim that the husband is not and that
the putative biological father is the biological father, and that the
best interests of the child would be served by transferring the status
of legal father to the biological father. The petition must name the
putative biological father as a respondent.
(a) The petition shall not allege that scientific testing has been
performed or allege the results of such testing unless the tests were
performed with the knowledge and consent of both the husband and
wife.
(b) Prior to any scientific testing, the court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the child, unless it enters an order
stating specific reasons why a guardian is unnecessary. The scope
and method of the guardian’s investigation shall be specified in the
order of appointment and the guardian shall have immunity pursu-
ant to s. 61.405.
(c) If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence
that the sworn allegations of paternity are accurate, and [by clear
and convincing evidence] that the best interests of the child would be
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served by transferring the status of legal father to the putative bio-
logical father, it shall order scientific testing of the husband, wife,
child, and putative biological father and determine the issue of pa-
ternity. The testing of the putative biological father may be delayed if
one of the parties requests that his testing be delayed.
(3) If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence
that the putative biological father is the child’s biological father, it
shall then determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the
child’s best interests would be served by transferring the status of le-
gal father to the biological father.
(a) In determining whether the child’s best interests would be
served by shifting the status of legal father to the biological father,
the court shall consider the following factors comparing the benefit
and detriment of selecting one man or the other as legal father:
1. The permanence and stability of the child’s family unit, in-
cluding the length of time the child has lived in a satisfactory envi-
ronment and the desirability of maintaining continuity or creating
stability;
2. The capacity and disposition of each man to provide the child
either with statutory child support or with food, clothing, medical
care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the law
of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs;
3. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between
the child and each man;
4. The moral fitness of each man;
5. The mental and physical health of each man;
6. The home, school, and community record of the child; and
7. Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant.
(b) If it does not appear probable that either man will consis-
tently participate as an active member of the child’s family, either by
residency in the home or by visitation, then the best interests analy-
sis may place great emphasis upon the financial needs of the child
and the ability of each man to provide adequate and consistent finan-
cial support.
(4) If the court determines that the husband shall be relieved of
his status as legal father:
(a) It shall enter an order requiring the husband’s name to be
removed from the birth certificate, and the biological father’s name to
be substituted therein; and, unless not required by the circum-
stances, the court shall enter an order providing for a support obliga-
tion and visitation pursuant to the provisions of Part II.
(b) If such visitation is in the best interests of the child, the court
may authorize that the husband receive temporary or permanent
visitation rights.
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(5) If the court determines that the husband shall remain as the
legal father:
(a) It shall enter an order providing for a support obligation and
visitation pursuant to the provisions of Part II, if required by the cir-
cumstances.
(b) It may authorize that the biological father receive temporary
or permanent visitation rights, if such visitation is in the best inter-
ests of the child.
(c) It may reserve jurisdiction to enter an order shifting the
status of legal father to the biological father, only in the event that
the husband dies or becomes totally disabled prior to the child’s ma-
jority and the child is in need of support.
(6) Either the husband or wife may be served by constructive
service of process for an action under this section, but personal juris-
diction over the custodial parent must be obtained by service under s.
48.031. A putative biological father may not be served by construc-
tive notice, and scientific testing may not be ordered until this party
has been served and given an opportunity to respond.
742.305 Biological father’s rights to petition to become le-
gal father.—Any man who alleges under oath that he is the biologi-
cal father may file a petition to determine paternity and establish
parentage of any child conceived or born during the mother’s mar-
riage to another man.
(1) The petition must be filed either within one year of the child’s
birth, or within 90 days of when the petitioner knew or should have
known that the child had been born, whichever period is longer.  In
no case shall a petition be filed more than two years from the child’s
birth.
(2) The petitioner must allege under oath a reasonable factual
basis to support his claim that he is the biological father of the child.
The petitioner must allege that he is willing and fit to assume all of
the rights and responsibilities of a legal father. The petition shall be
filed with a financial affidavit sufficient to permit the entry of a tem-
porary child support order.
(a) If the court determines that the sworn allegations, if true,
would be sufficient to declare the petitioner the child’s biological fa-
ther, the court shall issue summons. However, the court shall not re-
solve the issue of paternity or permit the petitioner to engage in any
discovery until a temporary child support order is entered and the
first month’s payment has been paid to the depository as defined in s.
61.046(3). Child support paid under this subsection shall not be re-
funded in the event that the petitioner fails to establish that he is the
biological father unless the husband and wife raise the defense con-
tained in s. 742.305.
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(b) The petition must name both the husband and wife as re-
spondents and shall be dismissed unless the court obtains personal
jurisdiction over at least one party who is a custodial parent of the
child by service under s. 48.031.
(3) If neither the husband nor wife contests the petition, the
court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether there is any rea-
son that the court should treat the petition as contested. Unless the
court decides to treat the petition as contested, it shall enter an order
requiring scientific testing and shall proceed to determine whether
the petitioner is the child’s biological father.
(4) If either the husband or wife contests the petition or the court
determines that the petition should be treated as contested, the court
shall determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the
sworn allegations of paternity are accurate, and [by clear and con-
vincing evidence] whether the best interests of the child would be
served by transferring the status of legal father to the putative bio-
logical father. If so, it shall order scientific testing of the husband,
wife, child, and putative biological father and determine the issue of
paternity. At any party’s request, the testing of the husband shall be
delayed until the results of the initial tests of the other parties have
been reviewed. If the court determines that the petitioner is not the
biological father, no testing of the husband shall be required.
(a) Prior to this determination, the court shall appoint a guard-
ian ad litem to represent the child unless it enters an order stating
specific reasons why a guardian is unnecessary. The scope and
method of the guardian’s investigation shall be specified in the order
of appointment and the guardian shall have immunity pursuant to s.
61.405.
(b) For any child born more than 40 weeks after the date of the
marriage and prior to a permanent separation, proof by the greater
weight of the evidence that the husband and wife have an adequate
family relationship, no present intention to divorce, and a desire to
raise the child as their own shall be sufficient to prevent scientific
testing and to require the dismissal of the action.
(c) For any child born within 40 weeks of the date of the mar-
riage, proof by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner of-
fered to marry the wife prior to the marriage to the husband or that
she knowingly concealed the pregnancy from him shall be sufficient
to authorize scientific testing and a determination of whether the pe-
titioner is the biological father.
(5) If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence
that the petitioner is the child’s biological father, it shall determine
by clear and convincing evidence whether the child’s best interests
would be served by transferring the status of legal father to the bio-
1999]                         QUASI-MARITAL CHILDREN 283
logical father using the same procedures and factors as prescribed in
742.304(c).
(6) If the court determines that the husband shall be relieved of
his status as legal father:
(a) It shall enter an order requiring the husband’s name to be
removed from the birth certificate and the biological father’s name to
be substituted therein; and, unless not required by the circum-
stances, the court shall enter an order providing for a support obliga-
tion and visitation pursuant to the provisions of Part II.
(b) It may authorize that the husband receive temporary or per-
manent visitation rights, if such visitation is in the best interests of
the child.
(7) If the court determines that the husband shall remain as the
legal father:
(a) It shall enter an order providing for a support obligation and
visitation pursuant to the provisions of Part II, if required by the cir-
cumstances.
(b) It may authorize that the biological father receive temporary
or permanent visitation rights, if such visitation is in the best inter-
ests of the child.
(c) It may reserve jurisdiction to enter an order shifting the
status of legal father to the biological father, but the court may do so
only in the event that the husband dies or becomes totally disabled
prior to the child’s majority and the child is in need of support.
